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CHAPrER ONE 
... - INTRODUCTION 
The purpose or this thesis is an exposition or Will.1am James' views con-
cerning the free-w1l1 controversy. An err art will be made to see how the prob-
lem arose for him, the m&rmer in whioh he viewed it, and the way that, after 
many years or personal difficulty and intellectual struggle, he ultimately re-
solved the problem. Before beginning these matters, however, a word about the 
unity and consistency of James' philosophic views is in order. 
James has often been taunted, posthumously, with the accusation that he is 
nunsystematic. tt If by a system of phnosop~ is meant fitting everything in 
the universe into its proper logical.l.y demarcated compartment, James has no sys-
tem of philosophy. In fact he would rebel against the thought of such a system, 
both in himself' or in others. He hated system, in thill sense, and his own pic-
ture or the world leaves it full of loose ends and uncompleted processes. He 
considered this the only true description of' the wcrld as we find it. 
On the other hand, 1£ one means by a system or phUosop~ the answering 
of a wide varietyof' questions in the light of a ffIW basic principles, then 
James is systematic; and, his philosophic views are unified and oonsistent. 
James' writings and lestures cover a span of over thirty-tive years, arxi the 
• 
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clear example or this, it is obvious to anyone who has read more than a little 
or James, that his theory of truth, his views on ethics, hi. radical empiricism, 
his cosmology and his philosophy or religion, are all based on h18 distinctive 
pragmatic theory or meaning. It'is hoped that this thesis will also illustrate 
thill same unity and consistency with regard to James' handling or the problem 
of free will. 
Because James' philosophical views were so prof'use and varied, and because 
he wrote in the popular style of the lecturer, it is necessary before begin-
ning to show clearly where the matter of this thesis fits into the complex 
pattern of' his thought. Also, James had a distinctive way of viewing the op-
erations of the human c:rganlsm, and the psychological terms that are or partic-
ular concern here, "will," "free-will," "will to believe," and "belief," must 
be clearly explained so as to avoid confusion; however, this can be done in 
the proper place in following chapters. The best way to situate the particular 
". 
problem of this thesis is to show briefly the sweep of the thought here as it 
progresses through this and succeeding chapters. 
In the following ohapter the concern is with James' general philosophical. 
approach to lit e. We will show what he understands philosophy to be, and how 
this understanding or his clearly illustrates the stance that he takes in grap-
pling with the problems to come. It is part of' the thesis or this chapter 
that James' personal. psychological make-up has a lot to do with his view or 
life and, therefore, with his philosophy. Just as hil!l personal. make-up can 
tell us something about his advocacy of' pluralism over monism, or pragmatic 
theoryof' 'truth over correspondence theory, or his affinity far meliorism and 
........ _---••• ,,-.... '-)'--7ii'1--... '-..... : .n_ ........ __ ....... =.r .... _______ ~I111· •• -.;_, .... __ ' .. itlO:>Ch ' •• / )):,Wlt .. 
radical empiricism, of his need for novelty, so al80 it should be helpful in 
giving us an insight into his resolution or the freedom vs. determinism con-
troversy. In presenting James' general philosophical approach, the follOWing 
chapter must show how James arrived at his particular application of philosophiY, 
its meaning to him, aDd in what it consists in terms or the key aspects or hia 
"system." Something also should be said about his complementary theories of 
meaning; Paul Henle has aptly termed them the II tough-minded" and tender-minded" 
strains of James' pragmatic method.l 
It is the purpose or our third chapter to study at length William James' 
scientific will-theory as set forth in his classic PrinCiples ~ Psycholo~. 
With the general theory exposed as a proper context, we will consider as one 
part or that will-theory James' study of the problem or free-will; we will note 
the way that he considered the problem, the alternatives he set himself along 
with his resolution of those conflicting alternatives, and the consistancy and 
excellence or his answer to the problem. 
James ends his long study there with the admission that the problem can 
have ~ answer on the level of empirical. psychologyJ tor, the bare data cannot 





.' discussed. and interpreted, and James aftirms strongly in the preface that this ~i 
is philosophy and should have no place in a scientific study of the principles 
of psychology. Thus, we see that the problem or free will is a specifically' 
philosophical. problem, and we must look elsewhere.J,n James' writings for his 
lCf. his introduction to the James selections in Max H. Fisch (editor), 
Classic American Philosophers! Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, White-
head, New York, 19)1, pp. 115-127. 
.' I 
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formal answer. 
The fourth chapter, therefore, returns to philosophy as James viewed it. 
However, here the general philosophical. approach as set t orth and explained in 
the second chapter is now applied to the particular problem of this thesis. 
The nwill to believe" doctrine, a particular example of James' general philo-
sophic outlook is first explained. It is then applied, as his "tender-minded" 
pragmatic theory of meaning, to the even more particular freedom vs. determin-
ism controversy. The result is the tamous "Dilemma or Determinism" argument 
of The Will to Believe.2 ---~.....;---
Supplementary arguments for J&1Ies' moral option for freedom and the gospel 
of effort must be considered. Finally, his later views, briefly expressed in 
Pragmatism,) Essays !!: Radical Empiricism,4 and ~ Problems ~ PhilosoPhy,5 
will be studied and related to the central arguments given in ~ ~ to ~-
lieve. 
With the study of the appendix or ~ Problems !!£ Philosophy, the last 
bit that James wrote on our problem--this posthumously published Tolume James 
called his most metaphyaical wark--1t is hoped that a systematic and clear ex-
pos1 tion of William James' views concerning the tree-will contrOTeray will have 
been concluded. 
2The Will to Believe, and other Essay! !!! Popular Philosophy, New York, 
1897, chap~fIVe. 
)Pragmatism: ~ ~ ~ !2! Some Old Ways .2!: Thinking, New York, lti99. 
~ew York, 19l2. 
5Some Problems .2f. PhilosophY's ! Beginning of !!l Introduction to Phi1osC'_ 
New York, 1911. I 
-Ot 
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The final chapter or this thesis will contine itself to remarks and some 
observations on James' views and treatment or this problem, with the hope or 
making them more mean1ngtul or or pointing up some inconsistencies in his 
thought, if there be any-. 
With these few introductory notes understood, let us begin our considera-
tion of James' general philosophic approach to life. 
-'m $ 
CHAPrm TWO 
JAMES' PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW (E LIFEI THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
NECESSARY FOR SATISFYING A PERSONAL NEED 
Perhaps the first thing that one must note in stating any or William James t 
philosophical views is that they are primarily and. always from the standpoint 
of the subject. Any other approach to the intellectual life was for him preten-
tiousness. What James could not tolerate was "scientism," the uncritica.1 devo-
tion to scientific objectivity in !!! matters, under the pretext of personal 
disinterestedness. He spends practically all of the ~ to Believe striving 
to explode the notion that what goes under the name or science or a rational 
approach to the fundamental issues or human existence is ipso facto any more 
authentic or encompassing than rival points or view.l In fact, he suggests 
that beiDg scientific in the sense of basing one's outlook on the hypotheses or 
science is just one approach to lite, and that so far as certain questions are 
concerned a most inadequate approach. 
Where an impersonal. view is called for, where we are not required to take 
a stand but merely secure lithe tacta,. where we are prepared to de!ine objecti-
vity as the minimum participation or the individual in the resulte or his deUb-
erations--working a problem in integral caJ.culus, computing the force of elec-
lThough only explicitly argued at length in (the essays entitled) "The 
Sentiment of Rational! ttl and "The Will to Believe," the thought is a'v 1 dent 
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tronic generators ~ determ1niJ'lg an 1mpend1Dg fiscal policy, or studying the et-
fects of gang warfare on fanily lU'e in New York--there scientific objectivity 
justly rules supreme. Thus, subjectivity for James i8 not a mere indulgence in 
personal nostalgia or opposition to technical and scientific advance under the 
guise or maintaining an elevated tone; rather, it is the acknowledgment or a 
tremendous chasm separating problems or comparatively little import to the in-
ner man from those that mean everything to him, problems that do not permit the 
inquirer to forget himself in his inquiries. 
Philosophy, for James entails the maximum participation or the inquiring 
individual in the results or his deliberations and enquiries, since its results 
are always or great import to the inner man. There!' ore, philosophy is necessar 
ill" "subjectivistic," (i.e., from the standpoint or the subject.) The philo-
sophical answers that we seek to personal problems are never ready-given throug 
calculation or "objective analysis of the nature or things." To seek such an-
ewers is to pursue a false hope, for, philosophical enquiry intimately entail.s 
the philosopher, and the only answers one gets, gradually disclose themselves 
through personal choice. 
James expressed these views repeatedly. For example, in an address deliv-
ered in 1891 premonitions or his distinctive contribution to the theory of 
pragmatism are evident as he analyzes and emphasizes the need for subjective 
accompaniment to this common-sense philosophy of his: 
I ought to give a message with a practical outcome and an emotional 
musical accompaniment, so to speak, fitted to interest men as men, 
and yet also not altogether to disappoint the philosopher--since phil-
osophers, let them be as queer as they will, still are men in the 
... _ ................ ---------...... ------•• -------------... ,.:_hJfh1&~ --1;,."'-). 
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secret recesses of their hearts, even here at Berkeley.2 
Or, note that his denial or the possibility or an objective philosophy 
could give the casual reader the impression that he was against all scientific 
endeavor, which was certainly ~ the case. 
• • • what accounts do the nethermost bounds or the universe owe to me? 
By what insatiate conceit and lust of intellectual despotism do I arrogate 
to myself the right to know their secrets, and from my philosophic tm-one 
to play the only airs they shall march to, as if I were the Lord I s anoint-
ed?) 
In tact, in some instances subjectivity alone will allow one to get at and make 
one's own philosophic universel 
But in every LPhilosophiS! tact into which there enters an element or 
personal contribution on my part, as soon as this personal contribution 
demands a certain degree of subjective energy which, in its turn, calls 
for a certain amount or faith in its result--so that, after all, the 
future fact is conditioned by my present faith in it--how trebly asinine 
would it be for me to deny myself the upe .2!:. the subjective method, the 
method of belief based on desire ••• :u-
The result or this is that each manl s philosophy is unavoidably determined by 
the kind of man he is, even where from the viewpoint or his surroundings or his 
age the correspondence might appear paradoxical.S 
With James philosophic thought is carried on for the benefit or specific 
interests. All intellectual activity is definitely purposive. Truth is what 
it is better to believe, and thus it becomes one species of the goodJ it is 
purposive and valuational. This is not to ignore the tact that James was an 
2nphilosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," Collected Essays and 
Reviews, New York, 1920, pp. 406-401. ----
3nOn Some Hegelisms," ~ Will !:2 Believe, ,2E. ~., p. 211. 
4nThe Sentiment of Rationality," ~., p. 91. 
Sror example, Plato, Augustine, Kierkegaard, Newman. 
,'" 
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eminent scientist and that the "will to believe" was alw~s a ~ resort in 
settling problema. Rather, it is to call to our attention the fact that for 
James the really important questions in life--and one' a answers to these are 
what give one's philosophy its distinctive character--are all beyond science, 
and that the individual's way or viewing life are !!! ~ he ~ for answering 
these questions. 
If the philosophy is to be determined by the character or the man, the 
question must then arise I What kind or man was William James? 
The bare facts or his early lite are significant and easily told. He was 
born in New York City on January 11, 1842. His father, Henry James, Sr., 
famous in his day for his writing and lecturing abilities, had his own ideas 
about the education of his children, and they attended several schools both in 
the Un! ted States and abroad. Most or the period from thirteen to eighteen 
years or age William was at school abroad, and there undoubtedl.7 acquired the 
cosmopolitan touch that remained with him all his lite. 
Young James went through a period when he thought he was to be a painter J 
but a.f."ter a year's serious effort decided he could not excel in this field. In 
1861 he entered the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. In 1864 the family 
moved to Boston, and William entered the Harvard Medical School. In 1865-1866 
he accompanied Louis Agassiz on an expedition up the Amazon River. The years 
1867 and 1868 were spent mainly studying in Europe, aIXl in 1869 he received 
his M.D. from Harvard. 
Though the events or these later years are easily recounted, they are 
hardly the full storY or that period of' James' life. For, begirurlng with his 
-as m tn', $ , "trr m."' 'w • ettftd ". 
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adult years or study in Europe and progressively throughout the succeeding 
yeara, James seemed to be slipping into a desperate neurasthenic condition that 
could possibly have become permanent. It' a intensity was truly dangerows, and 
an awareness or this fact is necessary for a full realization or the impact or 
this period upon his later li.!'e. His friends and family seemed powerless to 
help him in this crisis. His account or the acute attack or melancholia de-
scribed in the autobiographical passage or the Varieties ~ Religious Experi-
~ clearly illustrates what he went through at this time. Like most cultured 
people or his day James declined to apeak or himself in his published writings, 
but recounted this personal experience indirectly as a ttreport from a French 
correspondent": 
I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some 
article that was there; when suddenly there f ell upon me without any 
warning, just as it it came out of the darkness, a horrible fear of rrrsr 
own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an 
epileptic patient wham I had Been in the asylum, a black-haired youth 
wi th greenish akin, entirely indiotic, who used to sit all day on one 
or the benches, or rather shelves against the wall, with his knees drawn 
up against his chin, and the coarse grey undershirt, which was his only 
garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure. He sat there like 
a sort or sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing but 
his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. This image and my fear 
entered into a species or combination with each other. That shape am I, 
I felt, potentially. Nothing that I possess can defend 'iiieigainst tlia't 
fate, if the hour for it should strike for me, as it struck for him. 
There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto 
solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering 
fear. After this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke 
morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my stomach, am 
with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that 
I have never felt since.! It was like a revelation; and although the iw~~e­
diate feelings passed away, the experience has made me sympathetic with 
the morbid feelings of others ever since. It gradually faded, but for 
months I was unable to go out into the dark alone. 
In general I dreaded to be left alone. I remember wondering how 
other people could live, how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of 
rt ,m t ••• Sf '1 .tt Utt tr • . 't ' >$ ** 
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that pit or insecurity beneath the surface or lite ••• I have always 
thought that this experience of melancholia of mine had a religious 
bearing.6 . 
Along with this neurasthenia there was an acoompanying spiritual crisis. 
An ebbing or the will to live for lack of a philosophy to live by, a paralysis 
of action for want of a morality, seized him. He became obsessed with the 
question: How can action be justified in the face or a universe permeated wi til 
evil? Perhaps an answer: 
But if, as in Homer, a divided universe be a conception possible for 
his intellect to rest in, and at the same time he have vigor of liill 
enough to look the universal death in the face without blinking, he can 
lead the ille of moralism. A mUitant existence, in which the ego is 
posit.ed as a monad, 'With the ~ood as its end, and the final consolation 
only that or irreconcilable hatred--though evil slay me, she canlt sub-
due me, or make me worship her. The brute force is all at her command, 
but the final protest or ~ soul as she squeezes me out or existence 
gives me still in a certain sense the superiority.7 
Perhaps the "lite or moralism" could resolve this criSis, he thought. If "vigo 
of will" is heroioally asserted, then perhaps one can contront evil, either wit 
the hope of conquering it, or at least of dying bravely under its force. This 
was the answer that James faintly perceived; he derived it from Charles 
Renouvier, a contemporary French philosopher who later became a correspondent. 
and a dear friend. Its importance in James' lite can hardly be exaggerated, 
as can be seen trom this insert in his diary for April 30, 18701 
6The Varieties or Religious Experiences A Study in Human Nature, New York, 
1903, We 160-161. - --
7Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought ~ Character or William James, Boston, 
1935, vol. I, pp. 322-323. 
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I think that yesterday was a crisis in 'IffY life. I finished the 
first part of Renouvier' s second. Essais and see no reason why his 
de!inition of free wiU--"the sustaining of a thought because I choose 
to when I might have other thoughts"--need not be a correct and mean-
Iiigrul one, rather than the definition of an illusion. At any rate, 
I will assume for the presen~--until next year--that it is no illusion. 
My first act of free will sb.al.l be to believe in free will.8 
By this simple insight into the possibility of a vigorous life James was 
at least able to stop the current of thought and emotion that seemed to be 
carrying him on to debility and even mental illness. His philosophical answer ~ 
to this spiritual crisis was by no means a cure, but it ~ a turning point. 
Fat' several years the road was hard, with only a very gradual incline, but at 
least it was leading upward to a more active life. James' commencement of his 
teaching career in l872--to last for 38 years--and his marriage in 1878 to 
Alice H. Gibbens no doubt were milestones along that vay. Mrs. James was known 
to all as a remarkable woman) a source or personal happiness and stability in 
Williaa's career, she 1nf1uenced his personality and. household to an evident 
degree. In addition, the very ~ of the marriage vas a source or strength , 
and steadying purpose f or him. 
James' debt to Renouvier was considerable. The first all.usion to Charles 
!Renouvier in the writings or James is in a letter to his father written from 
Divonne on October 5, 1868. From that time, Perry tells us, he followed Re-
nouvier's writings "with close attention and eager interest." Correspondence 
ibegan in 1872 and continued steadily till Renouvier's death in 1904. In 1818 
James contributed an article entitled "Quelques considerations ~ la methode 
subjective" to Renouvier's Critique philosopbique, and thereafter translationS 
1.3 
of James' papers appeared at frequent intel"'lals in that periodical. In 1879-
1880 James actually taught a course on Renourler at Harvard. Though a d1f'fer .. 
ence or twenty-seven years separated them in age, the two men shared ideas as 
philosophic equals and relished the differences that separated them. It cannot 
be doubted that "Renouvier's was the greatest individual inrluence upon the 
development of James'8 thought," as Perry affirms. It is also clear to those 
who have read both philosophers that it is the voluntaristic and fideistic side 
of Renou~er that touched James most deeply.9 Though there were differences, 
the substance or Renouv1er's thought and spirit can be found in James' own 
"Will to Believe" arguments. 
Perry emphasizes--and rightly so--two aspects or James' victory over the 
crisis of 1870: " ••• first, the fact that he experienced a personal crisis 
that could be relieved only by a philosophical insight; and, second, the specli-< 
ic quality of the philosophy which bis soul-sickness required.nlO 
To begin with the second aspect, namely, the specific quality of phUosop 
he needed to combat the sickness. We see that the fact that James from the 
very begjnn'ing or bis adult life BUttered an increasing neurasthenic condition, 
with an accompanying spiritual crisis, seems clearly to argue that it was a 
symptom or an underlying permanent soul-sickness, that would trouble him 
throughout adult life. 
One becomes all the more convinoed or this on reading in Perry that Henry 
James, Sr., known like his Bon to have been a dynamic and warm personality in 
9perry, I, p. 655. 
lOrbid., I, p. 323. 
-._-, .... 
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his ;youth, also as an adult went through what might be called today a nervous , 
breakdown because or an intense emotional conflict. He too only came out or'it 
when he found a solution pointing the way to a more vigorous 11t e. He records 
a traumatic experience not unlike that or his son described in the Varieties 
~ Religious ~erience: 
One day, however, towards the close of ~, having eaten a comfort-
able dinner, I remained sitting at the table after the family had dis-
persed, idly gazing at the embers in the grate, thinking of nothing and 
feeling only the exhilaration incident to a good digestion, when suddenly--
in a lightning flash as it were--"fear came over me, am trembling, which 
made all my bones to shake." To all appearances it was a perfectly insane 
and abject terror, without ostensible cause, and only to be accounted for, 
to my perplexed imagination, by some damned shape squatting invisible to 
me within the precincts or the room and raying out from his fetid person-
ality influences fatal to life. The thing had not lasted ten seconds be-
, fore I felt myself a wreck; that is, reduced from a state of firm, vigor-
ous, joyous manhood to one of almost helpless infancy. • • • This ghastly 
condition or mind continued 'With me, with gradually lengthening intervals 
of relief, for two years, and even longer.ll 
That William James emerged victorious from ~ crisis of 1870 'Would argue 
only to the tact that he had turned the tide, not that he had changed his un-
derlying nature. Thus, in calling attention to the "specific quality of the 
philosophy which his soul-sickness required,- Perry is striving to bring home 
to us the tact that James' personal approach to philosophy, his subjective 
style of thought, is intimately connected ~th this underlying nature. 
In emphasizing the first aspect ot James' victory over the crisis--that 
it could be resolved only by a philosophical insight--Perry is letting us in 
on the underlying reason tor the subjectivism of James' philosophical views. 
tF'or James all philosophic problems, as we have seen, are vital problems. He 
liThe Liter~ Remains !?! the Late Henrr James, edited with an Introdue-
'tion by-w'illiam ames, BOston, I8E'S, as quoted in Edward C. Moore, Ameriean ' 
Pra£lTlatisnu Peirce~ J8.I'OO8~ Dewe1l, New York J 1961 t p. 111. 
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looks for a solution not merely tenable as judged by scientific standards, but 
at the same time meaningtul enough to live by. It Philosophy was never, for 
James, a detached and di8passionate inquiry into truthJ still less was it a 
form of amusement. It was a quest, the outcome of which was hopefully and fear-
fully apprehended by a soul on trial and awaiting its sentence.n12 Philosophy 
thus was never a mere theory for him, but always a set of beliefs which recon-
ciled him to lite. 
Let us return now to the specific quality of James' philosophic approach 
to life; for, that is our main concern here. First, a word a.bout how he 
arrived at it and what it meant to him. 
James required a philosoph,. to save him, not just any philosop~ but one 
suited to his particular ditficu1ty. Yet, he did not sit down of an afternoon 
with the propositions of the main currents of Western thought spread out before l 
him f cr the cold selection of a patch-quilt philosophy. At first glance his 
views might seem to be a patch-quUt. Viewed from within, however, they are a 
consistent whole, only arrived at atter years or struggling with monism and 
pluralism, correspondence and pragmatic truth-values, idealism and empiricism, 
a dynamic universe of novelty and. a cantorting, static one. 
James honestly and. painfully wcrked at a philosophy that would be true be-
cause it meant something to him. The fact that it resolved a personal 1'1 u~, I 
and satisfied an individual concern does not render it worthless for other men. 
It merely asserts his own dependence upon it. What fulfilled a person~J. need 
became meaningful--as James discovered that first year that he gave Renouvier's 
12 Perry, I, p. 323. 
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doctrine the test--and meaningfulness is all that any philosopher asks of a' 
system. 
Thus, James' therapeutic insight became a "gospel of belie!, a philosophy 
of the will to believe." He was truly "a strong man overcome by weakness."l) 
That weakness was resolved in one instance by a simple decision to believe in 
free will as leading to action, and to act thereby. To believe by an act of 
the will in the efficacy of will leads to an exercise of that will and to ac-
tion. If it worked once, it may work again; thus, James tried it f or a li!' e-
time. 
This key to a cure became the center of' an outJ.ook and the core of a phil-
osophy. It was not consciouSly and coldly decided for; nor was it stumbled 
upon and kept because it placed one in a euphoria of optimistic fellow-feeling. 
No, this answer to a personal problem worked; it satisfied a personal need that 
James felt at the center or his personality. Others obviously have felt this 
need for dynamic assertion of one's will to sustain inner life and balance; 
perhaps all men unconsciously have this need. At any rate, for him it 'WOrked; 
therefore, it must be true. It must tell something about all or reality. This 
-
is the way that James' thought seems painfully and slowly to have evolved into 
a philosophy over the years after 1870. 
Now that we have seen how James arrived at his phUosophy and what it 
meant to him, let us look in more detail at the distinctive approach his philos 
oplly took after his resolution of the 1870 ,crisis. What were some of its 
aspects? Can this approach really be seen throughout the many parts of his 
__ ---~ "Mr ___ .. __ ~ lIIIII.tr_'liIoIIklflllttt_llllliftlllll'IIIIIIM.tt.' ••• 'd .. ·.. ' Me ........ ' .. ' .. ' ______ ........ '.5 •• , ....... c .. 1 illldiilillilll.,t.J .... ; .... ,...;,.·~_""'· .. ffilitilitiiill~~·~·'1~.·(.t>~,~, 
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canplex and varied "system"? 
Perhaps the clearest statement or JaDeS' distinctive approach to litewu 
written in 1878 in a letter to his wire, 
-
I have often thought that the best way to define a man's character would 
be to seek out the particular mental or moral attitude in which, when it 
came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. 
At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says, "This is 
the real me." ••• This characteristic attitude in me always invOlVes an 
element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were, and trusting 
outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but 
without any guaranty that they will. Make it a guaranty -- and the atti-
tude immediately becomes to my consciousness stagnant and stingless. Take 
away the guaranty, and I feel (provided I am ~berhaupt in vigorous con-
dition) a sort of deep enthusiastic bliss, of bitter Willingness to do 
and suffer anything, which translates itself physically by a kind of sting 
ing pain inside my breast-bone (don't smile at this -- it is to me an 
essential element of the whole thing~) and which, although it is a mere 
mood or emotion to which I can give no form in 'Words, authenticates itself 
to me as the dee~st principle of all active and theoretic determination 
which I pOBsess.14 
There seems to be almost a physical need for unsureness, for novelty that is 
fraught with the danger of failure, for a complicated and unclear series or 
forces that le.ft alone would probably lead to destruction. This seems strange 
till one recalls that this was just the situation at the time that James faced 
the crisis or 1870 and survived by an exertion of his will. 
If strong vigorous exertion or his internal. powers is the cure for a man 
afflicted with the tendency to ro1apse into Bome sart or netlrA.st.hE""io JI1E"lan-
cholia, then it seems quite nAtural that thti lilian will ntlVbr [tltll bCi.tibt'it:>d un-
less he is encountering the unsure and dangerous circumstances that will con-
tinuously call forth from him the heal tht"ul exercise of those internal r orees • 
14rhe Letters of l<lilliam James, edited by his son Henry James, New York, 
- -1920, pp. 199-200. 
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Once make the sLtuation comfortable and sure, and the man settles into a leth-
argio state or "stagnant and stingless consciousness." The situation seems 
, 
comparable to that or building up the proper muscles, by' their strong and vig-
--
orous exercise, for a man to run the four-minute mile--here, to run the course 
of a vigorous life. Or, better, suppose a man to be dependent for his life 
upon the strength and vigor of a particular muscle about his heart, which can 
only be sustained by its own peculiar exercise. A lack of the circumstances 
that allow for this exercise will eventually result in the deterioration or 
atrophy or the specialized muscle, and the man's death. 
So also William James possessed an internal power that required exercise 
to maintain its strength. The power was his will, the center or his full men-
tal life; the circumstances necessary for its exercise were a world fraught 
.+ .. ~ 
with novelty, unaureness, danger, a pluralistic universe filled with loose ends 
and uncompleted processes, the teeming richness and immediate disorder and cha-
otic novelty of everyday life. The immediate effect of the presence of these 
circumstances to James was the exercise of his internal powers, particularly 
his will to believe. Remove the circumstances and there is no chance lor the 
exercise or those powers. Therefore, those circumstances were as necess&r,1 tor 
James' health and happines8 as the ordinary exercise or one' e internal polo/cn.! 
and faculties are for any man. 
With James, because of his individual. nature and peculiar problems, the 
circumstances mentioned above were a peculiar necessity. Equally as sensitive 
and as productive as James, another man may need different ci!"cumstancesj yet, \_: 
they are both alike in that they need, and always secure tor themselves, the i 
view or life that will ensure their healthy, energetic living. It is part of 
,'" 
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the thesis of. this chapter that James needed ~ vigorous exercise .2!. ~ ~ 
and !!:!!!!!! internal faculties ~ maintain health ~ happiness, ~ ~ ~ 
"circumstances necessarl" !2.!: ~ ~ !E:! way .2!. looking ~ reall ty, ~ 
foundation of ~ philosophy. Without the philosophy that he arrived at 80 
painfully and carefully James could not have exercised his will to believe in 
the many things that made life so meaningful to him. Without the exercise or 
that will and the beliefs he attained by it, James could not have worked hia 
way back as he did to a vigorous productive lifeJ he would not have been the 
llliam James that will always be lovingly remembered as a man and highly re-
spected as one of the outstanding figures of the classic period of American 
philosophy. 
Thus it must be said that the "circumstances necessary" emphasized above 
were the tenor aid general tone of James' philosophy. Others may find them-
selves, through the inevitable onrush of ille and events, possessed of a~­
anschauung. James must work out one ahead of time with which to live, without 
which he could not live. Those "circumstances necessary" were the foundation 
of. James' philosophy. 
It is a further part or the thesis defended here that James could not 
mea.n1ngfully have exercised his will, unless he sincerely believed in the free-
dom or the will. This belief' is only part of the "circumstances" necessary for 
the full functioning of that will; it is part of' his philosophy, and yet it ala 
seems to be the center of that philosophy. As a result, there 18 a etrange co-
relationship between what James held concerning the freedom of the will and 
other parts of' his philosophy. 
I 
1 
James was driven at one time to affirm that the possibility of vOllt~:~al. i 
,'" 
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attention--we will see in the next chapter that by this he meant free-nil--
was the "pivotal question or metaphysics, the very hinge on which our picture 
or the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism, monism, toward spiritual-
ism, freedom, pluralism,--or else the other way."lS Could the centraJ.ity of 
freedom in James' thought have anything to do with the fact that he resolved 
the crisis or 1670 by a free decision to believe in free will? This is a 
question that only he could answer. Rather, let us now look at some of the 
facets or James' philosophical thought and note their interdependence with his 
option for free will. 
To begin with pluralism--that philosophical outlook that James strongly 
defended against all comers, friend or foe alike, till his death--we see that 
• 1 
it can hardly be explained except in terms of free will. James tells us in the 
essay, "The Dilemma or Determinism," that 
The only consistent way or representing pluralism and a world whose parts 
may affect one another through their conduct being either good or bad is 
the indeterministic way. What interest, zest, or excitement can there be 
in achieving the right way, unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong 
way i~ a possible and natural way -- nay more, a menacing and an imminent 
way110 
And the indeterministic way here means the way or free will, for "future voli-
tiona are as a matter or fact the only ambiguous things we are tempted to be-
lieve in."17 Or expressed in terms: of' novelty, which for James is 80 d1stinct-
l'The Principles or Psychologz, New York, 1690, vol. I, p. 446. 
l6.rhe Will to Believe, ~. cit., p. 175. I am partly indebted for scme or I 
the following references to J .S.'BIxier, Religion ~ ~ Philosophy of William ' 
,James, Boston, 1926, chapter IV. 
17 Ibid., p. 177. 
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ly a pluralisticconceptiona "Free will means nothing but real novelty,; so 
pluralism accepts the notion or free will.R18 
Radical empiricism~ another equally important aspect or James' thought~ 
offers evidence for freedom, and at the same time finds that the fact of free-
dom confirms its own postulates. 'Whatever is in experience is real. Volition 
is a clear fact of experience~ and accompanied by effort it makes its presence 
felt with a special emphasis. "The existence of ••• effort as a phenomenal. 
fact in our consciousness cannot, of course, be doubted or denied.H19 Volition 
for James means attention~ and of attention he sayst "We feel as if we could 
make it really more or less, and as if our free action in this regard were a 
genuine critical point in ~ature.n20 More will be said of attention and will 
in our third chapter~ but it is clear here that radical empiricism. points to 
freedom as an indubitable object of experience. 
However~ it al.so finds in the ~ of free will evidence tor its own t~.1 
or relations. This theory is best eXpressed 1n the statement that tithe rela-
tions between things, conjunctive as well as diljunctive, are just as much mat-
ters of direct particular experience, neither more 80 nor less 80, than the 
things themselves.R21 To support this theory radical. empiricism is quick to 
18Some Problems 2!. Philosophy, 2I!. cit., p. 141. 
19Principles, vol. II, p. 535. 
20ralks to Teachers on Psychology, 
Ideals, New York, 1920, p:-191. 
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seize upon any evidence it can fiM or conjunctive relations which are obvious-
ly experienced. The experience of change is clearly the experience of' a re-
lation which binds that which went before to that which is coming atter. AM 
James would ask, Where is the fact or change more evident than in the experi-
ence or deciding between two alternatives? In a chapter of Essays in Radical 
Empiricism (entitled tiThe Experience or Activity") James explains that what 
transcendentalists have called a category of' causation and have found to exist 
only in the synthetic activity or the mind itself, actually is found in free 
will or spiritual. causality, as a definitely experienced relation. Thus, radi-
cal. empiricism not only offers evidence for freedom but uses the fact of freedom 
as a proof' for its theory of relations. 
Meliorism is an aspect of' James' thought that is seldom mentioned today', 
but it also has aclear relationship to James' free-will. It is the belie! that 
man can cooperate with God in building a better universe. James had this to say 
of the two parts of his thought in their relation to each other I 
••• persons in whom knowledge of the world's past has bred pessimism 
(or doubts as to the world's good character, which becalle certainties 
if' that character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome 
free-will as a melioristic doctrine. It holds up impl'"ovement as at 
least possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion or 
possibility is born of' human ignorance, and that necessity and impossi-
bility between them rule the destinies or the world. 
Free-will is thus a general. cosmological theory or promise •••• 22 
Pragmatism, in its struggle against rationalism, perhaps owes more than 
any other aspect of James' thought to his decision for freedom over determinis:n.. 
Wor, " ••• the essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-
22 Pragmatism, ,EE. ~., p. 119. 
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made and complete trom all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the 
mak:I.ng.n 23 Certainly there is no possibility or man's "making reality" unless 
he is f!!! to do so; in a purely determined block-universe there would be no 
room for a theory like pragmatism. 
Furthermore, according to pragmatism, truth is something that "happens to 
ideas." Certainly then, we must be free and have some control over the sur-
rounding circumstances of our lite so that truth can happen to our ideas more 
easily then it otherwise would have. It is the core of the "tender-minded" 
strain of James' pragmatic method that we are !.!:!! ~ choose that part ot real-
ity which only we can make to be true. Certainly there is the objective ele-
~nt of truth that we only accept, but we cannot let it weigh so heavily upon 
us that we refuse to take up the controls and fashion our own future--ma~ing 
it, therefore, true. or course, all this relies on the fact that the will is 
free. 
One or the main concerns for James in ~ Problem.'3 of Philosophy, his 
last work and admittedly his most metaphysical, i~ noveltz. Logically, it must 
be present in the lOrld it: the future is in ~ sense independent of the pa!lt; 
lVe have the experiential proof or ita presence in the free purposive activity 
of the human organism. Only in the choosing and full functioning or the human 
individual do we find a break in the rigid sequence of a determined universe. 
Each man differs from others, not so much because he possesses a different bit 
of matter, but by virtue or his own interests and effort, and this novelty is 
~ultipl1ed all the more by the free creative activity that each man performs. 
2.3rbid. J p. 257. 
* 
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:"!lu.s, man by' his unique individuality resists all classit'ication; be illustrates 
this most clearly by his free oreative activity. Therefore, freedom and 
novelty necessarily must go together in James' thought. 
With this brief illustration of the impact or James' choice or freedom 
upon his pluralism, radical empiricism, meliorism, pragmatism, and theory of 
novelty, the last point or the thesis or this chapter has been tentatively es-
tablished. That thesis could be swmna.rized as follows: (1) James' personality 
inrluenced his view or lite and reality, and hence, his philosophy. In this he 
was no different from any other thinker or philosopher. (2) His personality 
was such that it r~ired the frequent and dynamic functioning or his powers, 
especially' his will, in the form or a gospel or effort and a vigorous struggle 
for the betterment of mankind. (3) The intellectual "circumstances necessary" 
within him for the healthful functioning or his 'Will were nothing more than 
(the foundation or) his philosophical views. It was necessary that he view 
reality in a manner consonant with a dynamic, outward-driving approach to lit'e; 
and, likewise that approach would quite naturally tend to structure his view or 
reality (a structuring from without and a structuring frOm within). (4) There-
fore, James I resolution of the problem or free will seems to be both a ~ or 
the "circumstances," the philosophy, necessary for his dynamic approach (in the 
s'ense that among other Philosophical truths he must intellectually be convinced f 
also or the Will's freedom, for him to be meaningtully exercising it-this is 
a structuring from without) and in some sense the center or his philosophy 
(since' the dynamic approach that characterized all his thought is actually a 
real embodiment of his belief in freedom--a structuring from within). 
_-----•. ,--...... ----..... ---.. ,----______ ..... '.... tillll'$ __ .'1._II-.l§.elie-li~'l:gili~'''¥aM·iji~ .. ·~i'.;;;.;:~: 
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Considering this fourth point we see that the centrality in James' phil-
osophy of his belief' in the freedan of the will can be shown in a number of 
ways. As was shown here it had a distinctive influence upon his pluralisml 
radical empiricisml meliorism, pragmatism, and theory of novelty. Secondly I 
his doctrine of the !!!!! to believe I implying freedom, is his distinctive con-
tribution to the theory of pragmatism. Thirdly, throughout his philosophical 
writings James affirms that the will and its freedom are of foremost concern. 
Finally, the dominance or will-theory in James' psychological writings seems to 
point to the importance that it ltlWIt play in his philosophy. Our study of the 
Principles of Psychology and what James has to say there of the freedom vs. 
deterMinism controversy will begin with a consideration of this very point. 
Now that we have Been James' personal need for the frequent, dynamic fune-
tioning of his volitional nature and the circumstances necessary for that 
functioning, which constitute his general philosophical approach to life, let 
us turn back to his early consideration of the freedom vs. determinism contro-
" 
r: 
versy. Let us watch how he baDlles the problem, first &8 an empirical psychol-
ogist (this in our third chapter on the will-theory in the Principles and James' -
refusal to answer the problem of "freedom or determinism" there), and then as a 
moral philosopher (this in our fourth chapter Where we apply the general phil-
osophical approach or this chapter to the particular problem of this thesis l 
and come up with James' answer). We should see clearly how the answer William 
James arrived at fits into the "circumstancestl necessary for the dedicated, 
productive life that endeared him to all who came to know him and aseured him 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PRINCIPLES: MECHANISM VS. INDETERMINISM, A DILEMMA 
The willing department of our nature • • • dominates both the con-
ceiving department and the .feeling department; or, in plainer English, 
perception and thinking are only there .for behavior' B sake. I am sure 
I am not wrong in stating this result as one of the .fundamental conclu-
sions to which the entire drift o.f modern physiological investigation 
sweeps us. If asked what great contribution physiology has made to psy-
chology of late years, I am sure every competent authority will reply 
that her influence has' in no way been so weighty as in the copious illus-
tration, verification, and consolidation of this broad, general point of 
view. l 
Thus William James leaves no doubt in the reader's mind how he at least 
conceives the hierarchy or man' B psychological operations. Though these words 
were first uttered in a lecture given at Princeton in 1881 and set .forth in the 
!!.!!! ~ Believe, a compendium of his moral. and ethical views, James gives ample 
evidence that such also is the measured judgment o.f his pB.Ychological investig 
tionB and writings. 
In his classic Principles .2!. Psychology, (written some years atter the 
Princeton address,) James studied the will in such detail that for one today to 
even begin to understand James' scientific view o.f man's volitional powers, it 
is generally accepted that he must read the entire two volumes and ~~en return 
for intensive study to three complete chapters2 along with Bome twenty-seve.n 
cross references throughout the rest of the book which together would form 
lThe ~ to Believe, ~. ~., p. 114. Ii 
2Chapters V, "The Automaton Theory," XI, "Attention," XXVI, "Will.a Ii 
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almost one third of the two volumes. In every key chapter the voluntary, or 
selective, or effort-feellng aspect of the total organism i.8 related to the 
matter at hand.3 
To acquire more than a passing knowledge of James' view of the freedau of 
the will as set forth in the Princ1ples--and this is the purpose of the present 
chapter--one must check the relationship that other p8,1chic phenomena could 
possibly have on the free functioning of the will. Practically spea.ld.ng, this 
means that one must have most all of the Principles at one's fingertips. 
At the very beginning of the first volume we are told that ". • • ~ 
pursuance 5!! future ends and ~ choice .2!. means for their atta.1r_'llent !!:! thus 
~ ~ and criterion£! the presence of mentallty in a phenomenon. II 4 Cle~1y, 
then, man's will is closely tied to all his mental operations. If one recalls 
that for James "attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies~'5 
he must further realize that chapters dealing with any kind of psychological 
process entailing momentary attention, must be carefully read tor applications, 
3I am especially indebted to ODe invaluable research tool in my study or 
the Principlesa Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books .2! ~ Western World, vol. 
3, The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of ~ Western !!t:';,ld, Chicago, 
19~ Here listed under the word,"will," can be found everyone of James' ref-
erences to the will throughout the 1400 pages or the Principles, which forms 
volume 53 of this Great Books series. 
4The Principles of Psychology, ,2£. cit., vol. I, p. 8. In this chapte:' , 
subsequent references to this edition will list only the volume and page number." 
Throughout the chapter emphasis in quotations, unless otherwise indicated, i~ , 
James' own. 




confirmatory or contradictory, or what is explicitly set forth in the "Will" 
chapter itself'. 
To look at this another way, if human thought "is always interested more 
in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, 
all the while it thinks,"6 then every important aspect or human thought, as set 
forth in the Principles, must be studied. Or again, if' "consciousness basicaJ.~ 
is always a fighter far ends," then the reader must catch it in the ~ or 
fighting, and compare what he finds with the general theory or end-fighting. 
Hence, it is evident that a theory of will permeates all the parts or this 
massive work and that any inconsistency in the theoretical exposition of the 
will should come out as it is discovered !!! act throughout the rest of the 
book. Not only is the will a, foremost aspect of James' moral. philosophy, but 
that it also stands a central theme--and problem--of his empirical psychology. 
James seems to have made it a point to set down all that he had to say 
r ormally or the will in two long chapters or the Principles, "The Will" and 
"Attention" whereas other references to the voluntary throughout the text are 
only illustrative. The plan here will be to set forth clearly James' Will-
theory in the Principles with a view to seeing it and how he resolved the : ree-
will controversy there. This will be done by a detailed exposition or the 
"Will" and "Attention" chapters. With the theory clearly exposed 8.S a context 
for our study, we will place within it James' treatment ot the freedom vs. de-
terminism controversy. By studying intensively the pages devoted exclusively to 
this question and. by close attention to references to it through-out the bco!<, 







ve shaU have seen the way that James considered the problem, the alternatives 
he set himselt along with his resolution ot those alternatives, and the con-
siBtency and excellence or his answer to the problem of free-will. 
Before we begin a word or two about the sources or James' will theory ltigb.t 
be helpful. James' psychology of the will is a combination or two doctrines, 
one concerning the feeling of effort, and a second, ideo-motor action. Both 
doctrines were set forth in one of his earliest papers, "The Feeling of Effort," 
published in 1880.7 Later in 1888 he republished his views under the title of 
"What the Will Effects,n8 in more popular form and with less stress on their 
phYSiological aspects. James said of this article that it excited more comment 
than all of his others put together.9 Both article s, mentioned in the first 
footnote of the "Will" chapter, are valuabl'9 in that they illustrate Ja..-nes' 
earlier views or his will doctrine, set forth in somewhat different fashion fro!!} 
the detailed, mature exposition of the Principles. The two essays and the ifi';i1P 
chapter differ only in presentation; their content is substantially the same. 
or the two doctrines that comprise James' psychology of the will, only the 
"feeling of effort" doctrine is direct~ pertinent to the problem of free will. 
James' full will-doctrine, however, must be presented to avoid the tr~ ... t.P.lent L_ 
a truncated problem and to ensure a balanced context in which to place his dis-
cussion of the ~ and its full meaning to the free-will problem •. 
7Found in Collected Essays and Reviews, £2. ~., pp. 187-219. 
8Scribner
'
s Magazine, III, pp. 240-250. 
9cf. Perry, vol. I, p. 702. James made this statement to Renouvier in a 
letter dated March 29, 1888. 
•• 
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"Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone knows, which no 
definition can make plainer.ltlO Thus, William James, in his own distinctive 
way, begins his long discussion of the will toward the end of the second volume 
of his Principles ~ PSlchologz.- The diligent reader cannot suppress a sigh of 
relief at encountering this "Will" chapter, for, man's voluntary and selective 
teoo.encies have permeated all that has gone be! ore, am a formal, treatment of 
the volitional aspect of the human organism is certainlY in order and long 
desired. 
This chapter, and James' full treatment of will-theory can be divided into 
eight parts of varying length and importance: (1) an introductory section, 
treating voluntary movements of the instinctual. type, along with a thorough re-
futation of the "feeling of in."lervation" theory, (2) ideo-motor action, (3) 
action after deliberation, (4) the states of the will, (5) pleasure and pain 
as possible springs of action, (6) the will-properl it is a relation between 
the mind and its ideas, (7) the question of ufree-will," (8). the education of ' 
the will. 
With the exception of the eighth part of James' will-theory, one can per-
ceive in this chapter a steady progression from instinctive reactions, to ideo-
motor actions, where the mind plays some part, to acts following upon delibera-
tion, which can be pleasant and flow smoothly, to acts that are difficult, that 
entail the feeling of effort. The progression is from purely organic reactions 
(on a sub-human level) to difficult, fully deliberate, attention-absorbing 
decisions (calling into play all the distinctively human powers of the organism);! 
10 II. p. 486. 
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it is a progression from those human reactions most removed from the concern of 
this paper to those that most directly point out and perhaps solve the free-
will problem. 
(As a preliminary note) one Should be forewarned that, contrary to the 
initial statement of this chapter, the "will"--at least as James is using the 
term here--does not convey one meaning obvious to everyone that "no definition 
can make plainer." For James, the will is something totally within the mind; 
it is a distinctive, precise relationship between an idea and the mind, that 
usually issues forth into action, response. f'Usuallyt' is deliberately inserted 
here, for, whether the response actually takes place or not is irrelevant to 
the question as to the presence of a volition in the mind. "The movements ",'hich 
ensue are exclusively physiological phenomena, following according to physi-
ological laws upon the neural events to which the idea corresponds. The willir .. s 
terminates with the prevalence of the idea; and whether the act then follows or 
not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the will itself goes.all 
Likewise, the mental operations preparatory to getting the idea before the 
mind have nothing to do with volition. Though to discuss these matters is to 
get ahead or ourselves in presenting James' will-theory, still it seems neces-
sary that we know more or less the area or concern when we are busy observing 
James' "will." 
One final preparatory note is necessary. It concerns the approach that 
James wished to take inLhe Principles, and the relationship of that approach 
to philosophy. In the preface James expressed his viewpoint well: 
llII. p. 560. 
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I have kept close to the point or view or natural science through-
out the book. Every' natural science assumes certain data uncritically, 
am declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws l ob-
tain and fram which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the 
science or finite individual minds assumes as its date (1) thoughts and 
feelings, and (2) a )ht;SiCal world in time and space with which- they 
coeXist and which \3 ~ know. or course these data themselves are 
discussable J but the dISCiis'BIOii or them (as or other elements) is call Ed 
metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book, 
assuming that thoughts and feeling exist and are vehicles of knowledge, 
thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical 
correlation of the various sorts or thought or feeling with definite con-
ditions of' the brain, can go no farther--can go no farther, that is, as a 
natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical.12 
There is no doubt that this was James' approach as an empirical scientist. 
But as a fully-living and deeply-thinking individual he could not forego a 
concern ~th the teeming richness and immediacy of personal experience. The 
resul t is that parts of the Principles can leave the reader with a diff erent 
impression from that intended in the preface. Ralph Barton Perry' has this to 
says 
He always lef'tthe impression that there was more J and that the more 
to came might, for all one knew, throw a very different light on the mat-
ters under discussion. He respected his universe too much to believe that 
he could carry it under hie own hat. These saving doubts arose from the 
same SOll"ce as his tolerance and respect for his fellow man. The universe, 
like one I s neighbor, is nElTer fully disclosed to outward view, and_ the last 
word must be a consent that the other should in the end be itself.1..3 
A further result of James' refusal to'1gnore the data of his own personal 
experience led to his frequest digression in a very unempirical manner to meta-
physical questions, like the exiBtence of the soul and the freedom of the will. 
To the skilled philosopher and the trained psychologist this mixing of two areas 
12I. pp. v-vi. 
l~uoted in Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, 
New York, 1950, p. 192. 
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of lmowledge may prove annoying .. but to the general reader it ie the source of 
rich enjoyment. Furthermore .. it was the only way that James could write psy-
chology. In this connection the final chapter of the Principles .. "Necessary 
Truths and the Effects of Experience .. " is important in its detailed study of 
psychogenesis for the strange blend of psychology and philosophy that it illUB-
trates. Gardner Murphy has said that "just as Wundt was the systematic psychol-
ogist par excellence.. so James might be called the ~s.ystematic psychologist par 
excellence." 14 
Just how much philosophy is in the classic of psychology that James wrote 
is too vast a question to be discussed here. We will strive only to watch and 
call attention to the presence of the two in James' will-theory. 
Let us begin now the first of our eight parts dealing with Ja."lles' will-
theory .. that which concerns his study of voluntary movements of the instir:.,tu.::U 
type. 
When it 1e said that J,ames l first division or the "Will" chapter deals 
with the instinctive aspects of the organism .. there is obvio~ly a need for so~e 
qualification.. since purely reflexive, instinctive responses involve no volition 
whatsoever. The intention rather is to study those reactl., vi man that in-
volve just enough advertance and attention to push them across the threshold to 
volitional action. As a soientist James wants to know the limits--here t:1e 
minimal limite--of the behavior pattern that is to be studied. He mw,: t .', v ..... ..., :' h.:> I' 
minimal requirements f or voluntary movement; once discovered they can L~ 1;.:, 
in constructing a complex theory to handle all the subtleties that are evic.', '~" 
in everyday living. 
---.. 
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All voluntary acts are secondary functions of the organism, James discov-
ers; whereas, 
Reflex, instinctive, and emotional. movements are all primary performances. 
The nerve-centres are so organised that certain stimuli pull the trigger 
of certain explosive parts; and a creature going through one of thesel5 explosions for the first time undergoes an entirely novel experience. 
For an action to be willed its idea must already be in the mind; thus, it 
is secondary. But how do these ideas get into the mind if they are not (by 
definition) the result of voluntary acts, but rather the cause of them? 
If in vohmtary action properly so-called, the act must be foreseen, 
it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can per-
form an act voluntarily for the first time ••• we must wait for the 
movements to be performed involuntarily, before we can freme ideas of 
what either of these things are • • • when a particular movement, r~v-
. ing once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an 
image of itself in the memory, then the movemgnt can be desired again, 
proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. l 
Reflection upon this fact should give us an an~Jer: 
A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in 
the memorYEl experlence .c:!. their involuntai7Perlormance, is thus the 
first prerequisite of ~ voluntarl ~.11 
James then proceeds to distinguish two types or such kinesthetic ideas. 
They can be remote, the result of impressions upon the remote organs of s~e, 
ar resident, the impressions of oneself as one i8 acting. Since one I 15 volltion-
al powers are far the purpose of personal action or reaction, then only the res-
ident ideas are our concern here. According to classical. theory there are two 
1511• p. 487. 
l6lbid• 
1711• p. 488. 
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types of kinesthetic feelings that can call forth resident ideas, efferent, 
those accompanying impulses from the nervous center outwards to the muscle, and 
afferent, those accompanying the sensory impulses sent back to the nervous 
center by the muscle as it performs its action, thus giving us the feeling of 
performing it. Classical theory claimed ~ kinesthetic feelings in the oper-
ating rubject. He feels the nerve impulses as they 1ravel out ~ the center 
to "innervate" him to action (efferenth and he feels the muscles &8 they per-
form, because they are sending ~ to the nerve center impulses of th~"nselves 
in performance-nth-effort (afferent). This minimal feeling of effort-in-
performance that James claimed accompanies every action is important to us, 
becaus'e he reverts to it again ""nen he comes to discuss difficult actions where 
the "feeling of effort" is quite evidently present and intense. 
But it is especially noteworthy that James, in holding to this "feeling of 
effort" theory, takes nru.ch time to refute the classical "feeling of innervation" 
theory, and in doing so illustrates clearly the norm that he will apply in ad-
mitting data for the study of the will. James revereed a judgment which he. had 
himself made formerly, that feeling accompanies the ef'ferent (out-going) current 
which innervates the muscle. 
Rather, he came to be struck with the fact that the "feeling or muscular 
exertion consists of an immense number of incoming sensations due to the con-
traction of the muscles of our glottis, chest, jaws, body and limbs, and to our 
strained joints and ligaments and squeezed or twisted sk'in.nl8 In other words, 
he rejected the feeling of innervation because he found !!2 feelinf. tl,.J.t "oas 
l8nv.lbat the Will Effects," OPe cit., p. 247. 
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not sensory, and hence afferent (in-going), on its neural side. Efferent 
nerve impulses must be there, because the muscle acts; but, between the brain 
emitting impulses and the muscle operating there is no feeling of innervation. 
The only feeling present is that of effort sent ~ (therefore, afferent) by 
the muscle as it functions. The 'proof' for this is that we are not conscious or 
anything else but the operating muscles. 
Perry says that fthe took this position quite independently, and conscious 
or the fact that the leading authorities, such as Wundt and Bain, 'Here against 
him.n19 The only norm that James cared to use for the admittance of da.ta was 
the conscious awareness after introspection of psychological and physiological 
phenomena within himself or the subject. He refused to be swayed by what the 
authorities claimed must be there, if he did not experience it. He says, "I! 
we admit ••• that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist after 
the fashion in which they appear.n20 It seems that psychology came to mean 
something different for James than it did for Bain and Wundt. His refusal. to 
turn from the humdrum disorder of everyday experience to exclusive concern in 
a neat, fully structured problem of "science," seemed tv mark him off somewhat 
from other psychologists of his ~. 
In applying his norm 01' conscious experience to the will, James asserted 
that 
• • • !!! anticipatorz image, ~, .2! ~ sensorial consequences .2f. 
1911 • p. 88. Cf. also Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 153. 
2OrI. p. 571. 
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a movement, plus (.2!! certain occasions) ~ ~ ~. these consequences 
Shall become actual, !! ~ onll psychic state which introspection ~ 
~ discern ~ the forerunner of ~ voluntar:c ~.2l 
Thus, in this introductory section, beside illustrating clearly his norm 
or "conscious experience," James has made it clear that "the idea or a movement" 
is necessary for voluntary action. He has further tried to show what the idea 
is. It is not the thought or the innervation which the movement requires. It 
is the anticipation or the movement's sensible effects. These anticipations 
determine what our movements will be. A question much closer to the free-will 
controversy is to determine ~ they will be. And this question leads us to 
the second part of James' will-theory, ~-motor action. 
Put clearly the question is this: 
Is the bare idea or a movement's sensible effects its sufficient 
mental"c'Ue; ormuS't"there-be an additional mental antecedent, in the 
shape 2f. ~ fiat;-crecISioii, consent, volitional mandate, .2E. other S'ln2 onymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement ~ follow1 2 
James' answer is that in most cases "tie bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes 
an additional. conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express 
consent, has to intervene and precede the movement. tt23 The cases wi. thout the· 
fiat are the more fundamental because they are simpler; the special complication 
that the fiat involves will be studied later. 
In adopting the theory or "ideo-motor action," James did not claim to be 
original. He had found the theory in Lotze in 1870 and somewhat later in Re-
21II • p. 510 








nouvier.24 According to the doctrine an idea once in full possession of the 
mind translates itself' into action automatically. The work or conscious voli-
tion is finished once the idea is firmly instated. For example, to perfonn my 
specific act, x, it is necessary to reinstate the idea of x which has been left 
in the mind as the result of a previous performance of x. The idea itself con-
sists or a reproduction or the kinesthetic sensations aroused by the original 
bodily movements. 
James explains this matter clearly: 
Whenever movement follows unhesitat~~~ ~mediate~ the notion of 
it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action. vie are then aware of nothing 
between the conception and the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular 
processes come between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of 
them. We think the actz and it is done; and that is what introspection 
tells us of the matter.~5 
The necessary condition behind this, however, is that there are no con-
flicting ideas in the mind. Either there is nothing in the mind or what is 












Thoughts go through our mind but do not issue into act because there are con- ,'1 
flicting notions present. We, can state then the general law that 
• • • every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the 
actual movement which is itS-object; and awakens It in ! ma.x:1..mum-cregree 
whenever it is not kept ~ ~ doi~ ~ ~ antagonistic eresentation 
present simUltaneously ~ ~ ~. 
James takes pains to show that ideo-motor action is "no paradox, to be 
softened or explained away." It obeys the law of all conscious action, for 
24cf. Perry, vol. II, p. 88. 
2511• p. 522. 
26:r1. p. 526. L-__________________________________________________________________________ j 
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consciousness or its very nature is impulsive. 
We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add some-
thing dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling wilich we 
have is the correlate or some neural activity that is already on its way 
to instigate a movement. Our sensations and thoughts are but cross 
sections, as it were, of currents whose essential consequence is motion, 
and which no sooner run in at one nerve then they run out again at 
another.21 
By thus explaining this theory, which recently has received strong experimental 
coni'1rmation,28 James hopes to discredit the popular notion that some "r,.li1l-
force" must be added to conscious activity to make it voluntary. He wants to 
prove that although the fiat is necessary in some cases, it is by no means a 
universal prerequisite for free acts. 
In passing it should be remarked also that the inhibitory ideas do not 
involve an express effort or command any_ more than the executive ideo-motor 
ideas do. Just as the bare presence or one idea prompts a movement, so the 
bare presence or another prevents its taking place. 
The over-all effect or James' full endorsement or the theory or ideo-motor 
action--and its relevance to the problem or freedOlll--ie that it gives one the 
impression that James is a thorough-going mechanist who holds the automaton 
theory to the hilt. The fiat that he has alluded to cannot be merely considered 
as data received. It seems now that the fiat must be explained, fitted in, not 
just accepted. 
Or, at . least , at this stage or will-theory we have man as an organism per-
21Ibid• 
28Cf • Margaret Knight, ~-lilliam James: 
Psychology, London, 1950, pp~1-162. 
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petually in motion (when conscious); he is like a television camera always 
receiving lightwaves from surrounding objects focused upon, then converting 
these waves into electronic impulses, and sending them out along the cable. 
-Man's waking behavior is the story or the opposing sets of ideas that contend 
in his mind, just as the It story" or a tllive" TV camera is the images that it 
picks up and sends along in the form of impulses. A further question, however, 
must be asked, which brings us stUl closer to our problem of human freedom. 
What determines the presence of the different ideas before our mind? vie under-
stand how once they are there, by ideo-rootor action they issue forth into 
action. But how does the "live" camera of our consciousness operate? Is it 
manned by a camera-man or is its selective operation left purely to chance? 
This leads us to the third part of James' will-theory, action after delibera-
tion. 
To explain the meaning or James' deliberation let us take a concrete case. 
The mind at any moment of consciousness is the seat of many ideas related to 
each other in antagonistic or in favorable ways. '",llull I continue typing?" 
.tNo. I want a cup of coffee now." nOr should I take a walk and get a bit of 
fresh air, so that I can continue working later?" One or the ideas is that of 
the act that I will eventually perform. or itself it would prompt movement i: 
mediately, but other considerations present to consciousness are blocking the 
motor discharge, while others solicit it to take place. 
The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecisic 
••• as long as it lasts, with the various objects before the-attention, 
we are said to deliberate • • • and when finally t.he origianl suggestion 
either prevails ana makes the movement take place, or gets definitely 
quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter ~ vol-
41 
untarz ~ in favor or one or the other course.29 
The motives that we may have for deciding at all, or not deciding, could 
be an impatience with the deliberative state, or an impulse to persist in a 
decision once made--both very cammon and very human motives. 
As James sees it there are five possible types or decision. Perhaps it 
would be best to let him explain them himself I 
The first may be called the reasonable~. It is that or those 
cases in which the arguments for ar~ against a given course seem grad-
ually and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to 
end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one alternative, wich al-
ternative we then adopt without effort or constraint. • •• In this 
easy transition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves almost 
passive; the "reasons" which decide us seem to oursel-ves almost to be 
flowing in from the nature or things, and to owe nothing to our will 
. at all. • •• 
In the second ~ of case our feeling is •••. that of letting 
ourselves drift 1-1ith a certain indifferent acquiesence in a direction 
accidentally determined from without and entirely apart from our- . 
selves. • • • ----
In ~ third ~ • • • it • • • often happens, when the absence 
or imperative principle is perplexing and suspense distracting, that 
we find ourselves acting, as it were, automatically • • • in the direc-
tion of one of the horns of the dilemma •••• nF'orward now~" we cry 
inwardly, tlthough the heavens fall •••• n 
The fourth for.m or decision comes when, in consequence of some 
outer -experience c;r-some inexplicable inward charge, ~ suddenly ~s.~ 
from the easy; ~ careless ~ the sober ~ strenuous mood. • •• lne 
whole scale of values of our motives and impulses then undergoes a 
change ••• all "light-fantastic" notions lose their motive power, all 
solemn ones find theirs multiplied many-fold. 
In the fifth ~ of decision ••• we feel, in deciding, as if 
we ourselves by our own Wilful act inclined the beam. • •• The slow 
dead heave of the will that is felt in these instances ma'u""~' j·' .. r_ 
a class altogether different subjectively from all the tb.!'!..".'; l-,rec,,,:, y<. 
29 II. p. 528. 
" ... ~ ___ ._---_____ "'f ._ ....... ' ....... ________ _.' _ ..... w
r 
.... _____ .... ' _. __ ... U ... 71 __ ... · !_·* .......... 'bt_~ 
42 
classes. • • .. Whether it be the dreary resignation for the sake or 
austere and naked duty or ali sorts of rich, mundane delights, or whether 
it be the heavy resolve that or two mutually exclusive trains of future 
fact" both sweet and good ••• one shall forevermore become impossible, 
while the other shall become reality" it is a desolate and acrid sort of 
act, an excursion into a lon~some moral wilderness.30 
Clearly with the fifth type or decision" we are coming close to the con-
cern of this paper. For, only where a feeling 2! effort, absent from the four 
former decisions, is present" are we conscious beyond doubt that the decision 
made is the result or our felt internal effort. Only where the decision 1s 
difficult and involves considerable effort can we be sure that exterior condi-
tions and phenomena alone can never account for the action that we will. All 
merely animal organisms will without fail function to sustain survival, to 
avoid the difficult and to attain the pleasing and protective. This fifth type 
of decision is "deliberately driving a thorn into one' 8 flesh,·3l am so it 
costs effort. 
If examined closely its chief difference from the three former cases 
appears to be that in those cases the mind at the moment of deciding 
on the triumphant alternative dropped the other one wholly or nearly 
out of sight, whereas here both alternatives are steadily held in view, 
and in the very act of murdering the vanquished possiblli ty the ch()oser 
realizes how much in that instant he is making himself 10se.32 
The existence at the effort as a phenomenal fact in our consciousness can-
not be doubted. James a.f'f1rms that its significance "is a matter about which 
the gravest difference of opinion prevails. Questions as momentous as that of 
the very existence of spiritual causality, as vast as that of universal pre-
3°11. pp. 531-534. 
3lll. p. 534. 
32Ibid. James gives no explanation for his use or "three" instead of "four" 
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destination or free-will, depend on its interpretation."33 It is necessary, 
therefore, that we examine the conditions under which the feeling of volitional 
effort is found, that psychology search out all the data relevant to these 
·.--
momentous questions • 
. We have arrived, more or less, at the core of our problem. A study of the 
first part of James' will-theory has given ue the first prerequisite of the 
voluntary lite--a supply ot ideas. We also gained there some insight into 
James' nor.m in admitting data for a study or the will--"conscious awareness" 
it was termed--along with a clear illustration of that norm. In studying the 
ideo-motor theory we were able to catch the will in actual operation, albeit 
in a very simple, elementary fashion. Ideas determine what our actions shall 
be; ideo-motor action determines that they shall be. We were then driven to 
ask a further question: how is the what-determination of a particular idea 
connected with the that-determination of ideo-motor action? wnat points the 
organism in this direction rather than that, supplying it with this chain or 
ideas and not that? What holds this idea before the mind rather than that one? 
Chance seems to be no explanation. Is it external. or internal tactors, or 
both, that determine this? 
We began looking at internal factors in our study of the third part of 
James' will-theory. Along with him we considered action after deliberation, 
and the five types of decision possible. We noticed that the fifth type begins 
to furnish some evidence pointing to the fact that the determinant is withl: . 
33 IT. p. 535. 
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Further, as regards our own study here, we see that in .being a clearly pa.iIlful 
decision, it gives hope of proving that volitions are ultimately determined 
exclusively by internal factors--a~ external ultimate determinants that are 
painful would eventually result in the death or the species, man, or the modi-
fication of the species so as to eliminate painful conditions (here, painful 
decisions). The univerally binding biological law of adaptation is the reason 
for this. 
Thus, the feeling of effort, according James' norm of "conscious aware-
ness lt offers ~ proof of internal causality. The conditions and implications 
of its distinct fiat must be studied. Furthermore, other factors must be con-
sider ed, for, consciousness alone is not the ultimate proof; it can be mislead-
lng, as in the druDkard, the dope addict, or the sleeping dreamer. Is there 
more that can be said about the will proper--the conjunction of the what-
determination of a particular idea to the that-determination of ideo-motor 
action? What about attention? Before taking up these questions, James di-
gresseas--at least as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned. 
In the fourth part of his will-theory James studies the possible states of 
the~. A will can be called healthy if' (l) the non-instinctive motives do.u-
nate the instinctive ones, (2) there is a sufficient complexity before the 
actual fiat is made, (3) the vision of reality of the actual will is richt, 
(4) the action follows the vision's lead. An unhealthy will is characterized 
by action that follows the Bt~~lus too soon (called a precipitate will), or 
by an imbalance between the impulsive or inhibitive factors of the will. If tb I 
impulsive factors dominate, one is afflicted with an explosive will; if the in-I" 
lhibitive, with an obstructed will. _ 
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There!! some discussion towards the end of this section, of effort: 
We now see at one view when it is that effort complicates volition. 
It does so whenever a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to 
neutralize others of a more instinctive and habitual kind; it does so 
whenever strongly ~plosive tendencies are checked, or strongly obstruc-
tive conditions overcome. • • • And if a brief definition of ideal or 
moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit 
the appearanFes than this: ~!! action in the ~ of ~ greatest 
resistence.3L.j. 
James in the firth section of his theory of the will considers pleasure 
as a reinforcer of action, and pain as an inhibitor. He asks, what relation 
do ideas of them have to the other ideas in the mind? Some people take them to 
be the only springs of action. This is false, however, because they cant t 
explain emotional expression, or the impulsive quality of all mental states. 
Furthermore, ideo-motor action, along with voluntas invita and unhealthy aspects 
of some pleasurable and impulsive acts, al~ disprove this theory. 
There are a number of complications that could lead to this mistake. For 
example, around all our impulses, there is a secondary possibility of pleasure 
or pain accompanying them; thus, the distinction between a pleasant act arA one 
pursuing a pleasure is very thin and can mislead some. Also, there is a : 
sure derived from the successful achievement of an act, and. the mind can ve' 
easily project imaginatively this pleasure back to cover the entire act, thl .. uK-
ing that it was the sole spring of the action. 
James wished to state that he is "not denying the exceeding prominence and 
importance of the part which pleasures and pains play in the motivation of c: 
conduct. lt35 He only wants to insist that it is no exclusive pnrt. He brings us 
3411• p. 549. 
3511. p. 558. 
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back to the main concern of this chapter with the remark: 
If one must have a single name for the condition upon which the impulsive 
and inhibitive quality of objects depends, one had better call it their 
interest. 
It seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impul-
siveness, not in any peculiar relations which it may have with paths of 
motor discharge,--for all ideas have relations with some such paths,--but ,! 
rather in a preliminary phenomenon, ~ urgency, namelyl. with which it is 
~ to compel attention and dominate ~ consciousness.)6 
With this let us move into the sixth part of James' will-theory, his study 
of the !!!!-proper. The specific question is, What is the will-proper, ar.d how 
does it operate in concrete instances of choice, espeCially, difficult choices 
where the feeling of effort is quite evident? 
James arfirtls that all that went before were merely preliminaries; we are 
now at the "intimate nature of "the volitional process. tt Since will is a rela-
tion between mind and its ideas, we are driven to consider the conditions which 
make ideas prevail in the mind. Once the idea prevails the willing is termina-
ted; for, from that point it is merely a matter of physiological. phenomena, the 
eff erent nerve impulses and the correct functioning of the organs concerned. 
"Volition is a psychic or moral fact pure and simple and is absolutely 
completed when the stable state of the idea 18 theren37 before the mind. Thus, 
". • • ~ reaeh the heart or our inquiry into volition when ~ ~ £l ~ E£,-
~ it is that ~ thought of any given object ~ to prevail stably ~ the 
mind.H38 
-
36rI. p. 559. 
37II. p. 560. 
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Here is the answer that James gives us to the question, How are ideas held 
fast before the mind? 
• • • attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies. 
The essential achievement of. the will, in short, when it is most 'vol-
untar:>:,' ~ to ATT1'ND to ~dilTIcliIt"obFct ~ hold ~ fastbefore the 
mind. The so-doing is the fiat.39 
Or again: 
Effort of attention is ~ ~. essential phenomenon of ~~ll. • • • 
What constitutes the diffICulty for a man laboring under an WT~se passion, 
of acting as if the passion were unwise? Certainly there is no physical 
difficulty. It is as easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, 
to pocket one's money as to squander it on one's cupidities, to walk away 
from as towards a coquette's door. The difficulty is mental; it is that 
of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all.40 
A further eX&'l1ple, by way of proof: 
Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others--if they" 
~ ~ get ~ quiet hearing; and passion's cue accordingly is always 
~~d everywhere to prevent their still small voice from being heard at 
all. "Let me not think of thatl Don't speak to me of that~" This is 
the sudden cry of all those who in a passion perceive some sobering con-
siderations about to check them in mid-career.41 
A final selection, giving still another aspect of James' answer to the 
questions 
Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other way, the atte!l' _en I 
must be kept strained on that one object until at last it grows, so as to 
maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention 
is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is in most cases prac-
tically ended when the bare presence to our ~~ought of the naturally un-
welcome object has been secured. For the myst.erious tie between the thought 
and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a way which we cannot 
even guess at, the obedience of the bodily organs follows as a matter of 
39Ibid • 
4Orr. p • .561. 
41rI. pp • .562-.563. 
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course.42 
It is important that James speak for. himself here, because this is practi-
cally all that he has to Bay of "the intimate nature of the volitional process." 
-HiS explanation is clear and his proof for this theory obviously is one I s 
"conscious experience." But, it seems that he never answers the question, How 
are ideas held fast before the mind? He only restates the fact, now in terms 
of attention. 
James gives us a few further explanatory notes about the will-proper in 
the remaining pages of this section. First, he tells us that the idea must be 
held fast till it fills the mind. This filling is what we conunonly call .£2!!-
sent. Secondly, he affirms that 
••• the terminu.1! of the psychological E.rocess ~ volition, ~ point 
to which the ~ is directll applied, is al·t1a;y-s ~ idea. • •• l'h~ 0fiiY resistenc7 which ~ ~ ~ possiblZ experience is ~ resistence 
w ch such an 1dea offers to being attended to at all. ~o attend to it 
is the vplitIonal act, aoothe oniy inward volitIonal act which we ever 
perform.43 
From this it is clear that will is not a relation between the sell and the 
"out-there"; rather, it is between the self and our own ideas. 
Thirdly, there are cases of consent without the idea filling up the mind. 
In the fifth type of deCision, for example, at the very moment that we eOflSB!lt 
to the idea of the action to be performed, its contrary is present to the mind, 
and it is this simultaneous presence of contrary ideas that makes so intense 
the feeling of effort. Thus, here the effort to attend is only a part of what 
the word, "will," covers; it covers also the effort to consent to sOlnethi.t1g 
4211• p. 564. 
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to which our attention is not quite complete. This is another way of accounting 
for the painful effort that is felt. ForI "it is unquaJ.1fied.ly true that if 
any thought ~ fill the mind exclusively ••• the thought l for that time at 
any rate, carries the man and his~ll with it.n44 
James concludes this section with the assertion that this business or 
willing 
••• is one of' the most familiar things in lite. We can partly enu."n-
erate its conditions; and we can partll trace its consequences •••• 
But the change itself Lin the will-ac!! as a sub j ective4Phenomenon is something which we can translate into no Simpler terms. ~ 
In seeing what James has to say of the will-proper, we seem to have set-
or external. He has claimed that "the strain of' attention is the funda."l1ental 
act of will," or again, that "effort of attention is thus the essential phenom-
enon of will." Therefore, it seems obvious that attention is the fundanental 
determinant. If the ultimate determinant of a volitional act is the in~9rnal 
operation of attention, is the problem of the !reed~ or the will then resolved? 
There seems to be internal causality; is man, therefore, free? For James the 
question is not that simple. By way or approach1ne his view or the question 
let us take a close look at what he has to s~ of attention. If the free-will 
controversy centers about the operation of' attention, then to solve it, accord-
ing to Jamesian psychology, we must first know what attention is for him. 
Attention is "the taking possession by the mind in a. clear and vivid form 
44rI • p. 568. 
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or one out or what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains or 
thought. Focalization, concentration, or consciousness are of its essence.n46 
If we bear in mind that James affirmed that "attention with effort is all 
-
that any case or volition implies," then it would seem that in studying atten-
tion we are studying the will. This is clear where he says that attention may 
be either passive or active and voluntary; this is easily comparable to the pas-
sive and active aspects or the rive types of decision. Passive attention is of 
no help to our study or freedom, but we see that voluntary attention is charac-
terized by the reeling or efrort. 
• • • we get it in the sensorial sphere whenever we seek to catch ~~ 
irlpression of ext.reme faintness, be it of sight, hearing, taste, s:r:.~ll, 
or touch; we get it whenever we seek to discrL~ate a sensation merged 
in a mass of others that are si1:d.lar; we ret it whenever we resist the 
attractions of more potent stimuli and keep our mind occupied with sorr.e 
object that is naturally unimpressive. vie get it in the intellectual 
sphere under e."{actly similar conditions: as when we strive to sharpen 
and make distinct an idea. which we but vaguely seem to have; or pain-
fully discriminate a shade or meaning from its similars; or resolutely 
hold fast to a thought so discordant with our impulses that, if left· 
unaided, it wou~~ quickly yield place to images or an exciting and im-
passioned kind. 
All these instances are obvious examples of will-acts, in James' very broad 
use or the term. 
It is interesting to note the effects 2!. attentions its remote effect 
is that "each or us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, 
what sort or a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit.,,48 The immediate 
effects or attention are to make us perceive, conceive, distinguish, remember 
46r. pp. 403-404. 
47 4 I. p. 20. 
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better than otherwise we could. 
Towards the end of the "Attention" chapter James asksl tlls Voluntary , 
Attention a Resultant or a Force?" This is basically the same question that 
he asks at the beginning of the seventh section of the "Will" chapter, the 
" question .2!: "~-!!ll.ft These two sections of the Principles should be studied ~ 
together, for, it will be seen that the answer that one gives to whether volun-
tary attention is a resultant or a force, will determine the way that one re-
solves the question or free-will. But, first the context of the question must 
be seen. 
In this seventh section James passes beyond the mere affirmation that 
lIif we admit ••• that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist 
after the fashion in which they appear ,tI 49 to a much deeper question. Now that 
we have the data of our experience, what does it mean, what does it tell us 
about the problem of free will? To take our clear instance of voluntary action, 
the fif'th type of deCision, we want to knows " ••• is the effort where it 
exists, a fixed function of the object, which the latter imposes on the thought: 
or is it such an independent 'variable' that with a constant object more or 
less or it may be made?n,O Or, in terms of the "Attention" chapter, is volun-
tary action a resultant or a force? 
In the first instancelt would have to be affirmed that we are deceived. 
in thinking that we are entirely responsible for the feeling or etfort that 
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accompanies an act and tells us that we are the ultimate determinant of a "free I 
choice." Rather, the effort is a fixed function of the object, which by an 
inherent quality that it possesses, automatically determines whether or not we 
will keep an idea or it before the mind and eventually will it. There is no 
need for a cameraman; the TV caroora is automatically drawn by same strange 
magnetic force within the objects that it is picturing, loihich causes the camera 
to picture these objects and no others at this time. When we think in choosing 
this rather than that, that it is we who are freely making the ultimate decisio 
we are deceived. There is no free-will; there is only a fully determined uni-
verse. 
In the second instance, effort is.a variable within ourselves, completely 
independent of the objects to which it may conform the attention. So that in 
the clear instance of one difficult object, there is freedom ~o exert ~ ef-
fort to hold an idea of the object clearly before the mind so that ideo-motor 
action can take its course, or ~ effort with the result that the action we 
perform is not in the direction of the difficult object, but of the easier 
effortless alternative. In either case the full decision lies within ourselves. 
There is a cameraman, in full control of the situation, pointing his TV camera 
in whatever direction he wishes with the result that the electronic impulses 
coming away are freely of his choosing. Our wills are truly free. 
We must now study the evidence for either of these Rl.ternativesj the IIAt_ 
tention" chapter handles it more clearly in terms of cause and effect. 
If feeling is an inert accompaninlent, then of course 
••• the attention which we give at e:ny time to p .... v S'.1bjf'~t. ••• is 
the fatally predetermined effect of those exclusl,· ,I matE y al la",:~. 
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activity reacts dynamically upon that activity, furthering or checking 
it, then the attention is in part, at least, a cause.51 
First, we see that "as regards immediate sensorial attention hardly anyone 
is tempted to regard it as anything but an erfect ... 52 As for derived attention 
--it owes its interest not to itself but to association with Bome other imme-
diately interesting thing--where there is no voluntary effort, it also seems to 
be a mere effect; because, the mind is drawn automatically by the pleasing as-
sociations that are connected with the object. As for voluntary attention, 
James first presents a very powerful case for the effect-theory. 
First of all we see that 
The things we attend to come to us by their own laws. Attention creates 
no idea; an idea must already~e~cre before we can attend to it. At-
tention only fixes and retains what the ordinarz laws of association 
bring 'before the footlights! of consciousn3ss.~3 
But once you admit this then it is clear that attention per ~ need no mera fix 
and retain the ideas then it need bring them. The associations which bring them 
can also fix them by the interest which they lend. Thus, as regards ~ effort 
to attend, 
We think we can make more of it if we will; and the amount wh1.~h we 
make does not seem a fixed functIOnCit--:uie ideas themselves, 8.tj it 
would necessarily have to be if our effort were an effeot and not a 
spiritual force. But even here it is possible to conceive the facts 
mechanically and to regard the effort as mere effect.54 
To take an example, let us say that a young man is trying to entertain 
5lr. p. 448. 
52Ibid• 
53r. p. 450. 
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thoughts of death in the presence of his S\'1eetheart. If he succeeds at all, it 
is at the cost of great effort. The thoueht of his sweetheart goes on of its 
own accord, while to keep the thought of death foremost in his mind, the man 
must continuously offer voluntary reinforcement, with the result that at each 
of these moments there is a strong feeling of effort present. He thinks that 
he freely wills to think of death. But dynam1cal~ it could mean only that the 
associative processes connected with death are really stronger, and in the 
girl's absence they would give him a passive unimpeded attention to death. Her 
presence neutralizes part of the brain energy which would otherwise be available 
for fluent thought. What was lost is converted into feeling, in this case the 
feeling of effort. 
James gives an excellent illustration here of how effort could be only a 
passive index of what is done, that clinches hie argument for the effect-theory 
of attention. 
The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole easy simple 
flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the pull of 
gravity, and effortless attention is the rule. But at intervals an ob-
struction, a set-back, a log-jam occurs, stops the current, creates an 
eddy, and makes things temporarily move the other way. If a real river 
•• , I 
could feel, it would feel these eddies aM set-backs as places of effcI!'t. 
"I am here flowing," it would say, "in the direction of greatest re~lsttr(l..t:1 .'r:~ 
instead of flowing, as' usual, in the direction of least. My effort 1.1:; 
what enables me to perform this feat." Really, the effort would only be . I 
a passive index that the feat was being performed. The agent would all the· 
while be the total downward drift of the rest of the water, forcing S(,T.''-' 
of it upwards in this spot; and although, on the average, the direction-of 
least resistance is downwards, that would be Mreason for its not bci:'..:~ 
up;{ards now and then. Just so with our voluntary acts of attent.i 0r'. " 
are momentary arrests, coupled with a peculiar feeling, c1' .::' : .. ' 
stream. But the arresting force, instead of being this pec·lic'.,r fet , ... 
itself,. may be nothing but the processes by 'Which the collision is pro-
duced.:;,5 
55 4' I. P. 50. 
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Thus, we see that the notion that "our effort in attending is an original. fac-
ulty, a force additional to the others of which brain and mind are the seat, 
may be an abject superstition.n,6 
But, it seems that the evidence f or the other side of the coin is just 
as strong. It is just as easy to show that the laws of stimula.tion and of as-
sociation form only the stage background for a star performer, the voluntarz 
effort to attend. "Nature, I say, may indulge in these complications; and the 
conception that she had done so in this case is, I think, just as clear (if not 
as 'parsimonious! logically) as the conception that she has not."'7 Therefore, 
man's will may be free; the evidence for this view is the feeling of effort that 
is clearly in our consciousness. 
We are faced with a dilemma. Both the freedan and determinist sides of 
the argument seem equally backed by evidence. To resolve the problem will not 
be an easy matter. In the "Will n chapter, James poses the dilemma in a slightly 
different way. There, he places on the side of freedom the evidence of all our 
painful actions where it seems that t.he effort is an independent variable. On 
the determinist side he places the fact that all man's effortless volitions 
"are res,ultants or interests and associations liIhose stre~th and sequence are 
mechanically determined by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; e'::id 
the general. continuity of things and the monistic conception of the world may 
lead one irresistibly to postulate that a little fact like effort can form no 
real exception to the ove~nelming reign of deterministic law.n~o 
'6~. 
'7r . p. 453. 
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Here is James' answel' to the dilemmaa 
My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on 
strictly psychologic grounds. After a certain amount for attention 
56 
has been given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether 
either more or less of it might have been given or not. • • • Neasure-
ments, whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and deductive reason-
ings such as th is method of proof implies, will surely be forever beyond 
human reach. No serious psychologist or physiologist will venture even 
to suggest a notion of how they might be practically made. We are thrown 
back therefore upon the crude evidences of introspection on the one hand, 
with all its liabilities to deceptioD9and, on the other hand, upon ~ priori postulates and probabilities.~ 
James applies the criteria that he set down in the preface and affi~ 
here that since objective data cannot settle the dile~~a, we are forced to re-
sort to discussion of the data, and this is metaphysics. In the preface he con-
tended that 
• • • psychology, when she has ascertained the empirical correlation 
or the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite condition~ of 
the brain, can go no farther--can go no farther, that i~~ as a r.atural 
science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. v 
Once you begin to discuss the meaning of· your data--which is a necessity for the 
resolution of our freedom vs. determinism dilemma--you have passed beyond the 
limits of empirical psychology and are philo~ophizing. Since philosophy does 
not fit into the scope or this book, then the problem of free-will cannot be 
h:mdled here. 
A further proof of the philosophical. nature or this problem ean be found 
in the fact that, although in the ItW111" chapter James presented a systematic 
and distinct study of reflex acts, then ideo-motor action, followed by ded sions 
thout effort, and finally decisions with effort, he would be the first to 
591bid. 






affirm that in actuality all these operations are going-on at once and merging 
together so imperceptibly that the scientist could never be sure of the original 
sources or the different phenomenal causalities operating there. 
Also, James seems to opt for a kind of neutralism with regard to the prob-
lam when he points out that where two forces of ideas are contending for pos-
session of the mind, and one through its abundance and dynamism wins its way 
to actiqn, we tend to "call the more abundant mass of ideas ourselves; and 
talking of its effort as .22!. effort, and of that of the smaller mass of ideas 
as the resistance •••• "61 But, in reality "both effort and resistance ,_~ 
ours, and the identification of our self with one of these factors is an illu-
sion and a trick of speech.u62 
James concludes this section with a defense of his stand concerning the 
question of free-will. He affirms that science demands uniform causality that 
can be traced to a clear determined source. Yet, everyday-living clearly shows 
that people are making choices wherein they experience indeterminate feelings 
of effort, and where no one can point to a sole cause for the action. This fact 
is not a scandal to science and. psychology; rather, science will continue to 
work within its own order, and will perhaps complement the wider order of phil-
osophy. 
Psychology will be Psychology, and Science SCience, as much as ever 
(as much and no more) in this world, whether free will be true in it 
or not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes 
61II• p. 516. 
62 Ibid• Perhaps this is a foreshadowing of tIle theory of pure ex:perience 
,mich James set forth so clearly in the "Does Consciousness E..xist?" chapter of 









are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which 
she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped 
in a wider order, on which she has no claim at all. 
We can therefore leave the free-will question altogether out of our 
account.63 
The eighth and. final sect:ton of James' theory as set forth in the "Will" 
chapter, ~ education £! the will, is concerned mainly with the effect upon 
the organism of choices made, and the way that those Choices are physiologically 
carried out. By definition James has excluded this matter from will-theory, 
and therefore,it will not be treated here. 
Thus, we have exposed at length William James' general theory of the will, 
thl3 alternatives that he set himself, the fact that as empirical psychologist 
;~1O fe}_t thnt the d.ata a1."ailnble did not warrant a choice bet..reen the t,,·o alte:--
natives. 
The many references to man's volitional nature trn"oughout the rest of this ' 
ma.ssive work would deserve detailed study here if they pointed up strikingly 
n~f aspects of the problem, or contradictions in James' treatment of it. Cer-
tainly they raI:(;e over a wide variety of topics, fro![l the relation:~hip of belief 
land the will, association and the voluntary, voll tional nature as the cause of 
'man's structuring 'of reality, to ethics and the training of the will, the mak-
ing of the future by one's own choices, and arr;un1cnts for and a;~a; nat the the0ry 
10:.' Mtomatism. 
j~nlustration of 
But all these rc.ferences contribute little r.:ore thc.n a clear 
the matter set c.oT,m in the "Will" and "Attention" chapters. 
63I 1. p. 576. 
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Obviously, James had been studying the will far many years, and there was little I 
room for arr:r contradiction in the will-theory that has come to be known as . !I 
distinctively his. I 
Further, he seems to have made ita point to set down all that he had to 
say formally of the will in these two long chapters--together they come to 
almost 110 pages--so that other passing references to the voluntary are only 
illustrative. 
In conclusion, it must be noted that although it is clear from James' 
,other writings where he stands as a philosopher in the freedom VB. determinism 
controversy, it is no less clear from the Principles itself that he felt free-
dom of the will to be the only meaningful solution to the problem. H' ' • reeo.O:!1 
.las mea:lingi'ul to h:Lm as a philosopher and necessary for him as a man. At 
various places throughout the two volumes, when the problem was casually alluded 
to in treating other matters, J~~es often broke the train of thought to affirm 
his stand as a philosopher in this matter. 
" I 
i <, 
Toward the end of the "Attention" chapter James most clearly adverted to I 
his "will to believe1t argumentation where he said that he felt that 
••• the whole feeling or reality, the whole sting and excitement of 
our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it ~.\\lngs are really 
beine decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull 
rattling off of a chain t.loJ.at was forged innumerable years ago. This 
appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such a tragic zest, 
May not be an illusion.64 
From his few open confessions of his own belief in this matter to his r~-
peated eulogizing of effort, it is quite clear to the reader that Ja"llcs has 
exe::-ciG8d the free will that he believes in" before all else, to opt for his 




right and will to believe in the freedom of man's will. But more of this in 
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the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE WTI.L TO BELIEVEs A MORAL SOLUTION TO THE mOBLEM 
James completed the Principles in 1890, and the years that immediately 
followed saw his gradual change of role from that of professional scientist to 
moral philosopher. Hardly intended explicitly the change merely reflected his 
shift of personal interest. This shift of interest could be most clearly seen 
in the growing number of philosophy courses that he taught, to the point loihere 
•• 
he finally transferred to the department itself. In 1892 Hugo Munsterberg, 
later taken along with James to be one of Harvard's brightest lights at the 
tUrn of the century, was invited from Germany to direct the laboratory that 
James had set up some years before. By 1896 James' psychological interests 
had even waned to the point where he declined to attend the International Con-
gross of Psychology held in l1unich in the summer of that year, although the 
Principles was much talked about on the continent at the time. 
The middle 90's were a time of browsing, of travel, and or popular leQtur~s 
for James. His thoughts were tending more and more towards the deeper problems 
of philosophy, but always considered as problems of life rather than of theory_ 
The abstract metaphysical manner in which so many wrote philosophy at that time 
often perplexed him. He unintentionally attacked the work of his good friend, 
G. H. Howison, by referring to the "triviality in abstracto," of metaphysical 
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The word came out or one Who is unfit to be a philosopher because at 
bottom he hates philosophy, especially at the beginning or a vacation, 
with the fragrance at' the spruces and sweet ferns all soaking him through 
with the conviction that it is better to be than to define your being. 
I am a victim or neurasthenia, and or thesense of hollowness and unre-
ality that goes with it. And philosophic literature will often seem 
to me the hollowest thing.1 ----
Nevertheless James did not hesitate to become a philosopher, both in private 
interest and professionally, because for him philosophy dealt not with trivial-
ities in abstracto but with the urgent realities or man ~ concreto. 
"Release from the pressure and discipline imposed by the writing of the 
Principles, II Perry tells us, "rendered him again vulnerable to brooding melan-
choly; and he felt again the need or a saving gospel. ,,2 There was an expansion 
of his human sympathies at this time, and of his political and social activi-
ties. The 90' s were the decade of the Spanish-American War and the Dreyfus case 
both of which stirred his "moral emotions. '1 He became active in the Society for 
Psychical Research, and this stirred up an old interest in religious mysticism, 
along with the strange experiences connected with it that James felt had to be 
accounted for as tactual data. Perry has called this decade James' period of 
reform and evangelism. 
One result or this period or James' lit'e is a volume ent1tled ~ Will to 
Believe ~ Other EssalS in Popular Philosophy. Published in 1897 and dedicated 
to "my old friend Charles Sanders Peirce," it was made up of articles and ad-
dresses written at intervals from l879 to 1896. Chiefly concerned with an in-
div1.dualistic fideism, the book, Perry tells us, is pervaded throughout by the 
lFrom a letter to G. H. Howison dated July 11, 1895, as found in Perry, 
vol. II, p. 207. 
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influence or Renouvier--ttcribbed from Renouvier," James once wrote to Peirce.) 
Before discussing the "tender-minded" theory of meaning set forth in this 
book and before seeing how James applied it to the free-will controversy, we 
must first understand clearly wiat he meant by belief, and its relation to the 
will in the "will to believe. n 
In the second volume of the Principles James begins a chapter, "The Per-
ception.of Reality," with a discussion of belief. This seems not so strange 
when we note that he defines belief as "the mental state or function of cogniz-
ing reality.1t4 He takes pains to distinguish it from imagination; for, when we 
imagine an object, he says, we merely apprehend it in some internal way, but 
when we believe in it, it is not only apprehended, but is also held to have 
reality. Furthermore, we can obviously distinguish belief from action. Belie! 
is internal, a purely mental disposition toward some reality; action is our 
physical entrance into and upon that reality. 
From the PE'evious chapter of this thesis, it should be clear then that will 
-
has a relation to all three of these operations of the organism--imagination, 
i: I 
belief, action. As we saw there, the materials of volitions are ideas. :But, i I 
imagination is the mere apprehension of an ~, ignoring its possible reference Ii 
,I 
to reality; belief is apprehension and acceptance of an ~ as embodying a 
reality; action is the personal entrance into reality as the result of the full 
presence to our attention of an ~ to that effect. Since, for James, fI£~ 
terminus of ~ psychological process .!!: volition, the point .!:.2. lmich ~ Hill 
Jef • Perry, vol. II, p. 209. 
4QE. ~., vol. II, p. 282. 
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!! directly applied, !!. always ~ ~,,,5 and since an idea in each of the cases 
mentioned determines the operation, then it is clear that the will can determine 
what we imagine, what we believe, what we do. 
-
The discussion in the "Will" and "Attention" chapters of the Principles 
was carried on almost exclusively in the context of action, of freedom of action 
because of freedom of will, of the idea of an act as the material of a volition. 
But, it is quite clear that external action is just one operation of the organ-
ism that is determinable by the will. We must remember that these chapters in 
the Principles could have been written in the context of ideas-determining-
belief instead of ideas-determining-action. Beside action-conse~t there is 
belief-consent. In fact it can be said that the only difference between an idee. 
of action and an idea of belief is the physiological resultants of the f~er. 
In the last chapter we viewed James' treatment, as an empirical psychologist, 
of the idea of an action. Here we will study his views or the idea of a belief, 
this time as a moral philosopher. 
Looked at in this light, as the determinant or !!!. ~-laden operations or 
the organism, the will, along with the question of its freedom, is clearly seen 
to be a central problem in the philosophy of man. If we bear in mind this een-
trail ty of will for James, we will want to observe the manner in which he han-
dles belief, now as a moral philosopher, so dB to use what we find as evidence 
pointing to his full mind concerning the will's freedom. Belief is a clear in-
stance of the organism's operation. The will clearly influences it. To note 
what James, as a moral philosopher, holds concerning that influence and what it 
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means, is to find James' views concerning the will and its freedom !!! action. 
Furthermore, the study of belief, rather than action or imagination, is 
far more philosophically meaningful, since for James what one believes con..., 
stitutes one's perception of reality.6 The question arisesl If the will is 
free, can one fashion one's reality to fit one's wishes? We may have the power 
to decide hoW' we shall act. But do we have any choice as to how we shall think? 
It seems that reality can only be accepted, not made. But if the relationship 
between the will and belief is as Janes says it is, and if the will is free, 
then it seems that we can make our own reality. Which is true, the absoluteness 
of reality or freedom of the will? Or is this a false dilemma, in the sense 
that Ja.'Tles' analysis of will and belief, and their influence on reality is 'WrOng? 
Or have we misunderstood his doctrine, creating for ourselves this false di-
lemma? Answers to these questions should emerge in this chapter as we study 
James' philosophic views of the free-will controversy. 
First, we must understand James' general fideistic approach to philosophy 
before we can grasp intelligently its application by him to the problem of free 
will. This approach was most clearly set forth in a lecture given at Harvard 
in the summer of 1895, and later published as the lead essay in the volume bear-
ing its name, The Will ~ Believe. 
James begins "The Will to Believe" with a discussion of hypotheses, show-
ing that for an hypothesis to be eligible for free choice it must be living 
(meanineful to the chooser), forced (to be decided immediately), and momentous 
(not trivial). When a hypothesis conforming to these conditions is present, 
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then our non-intellectuaJ. nature is sure to influence our decision. In fact 
James first states his thesis thus: 
~ passional nature not only lawfulq may, but must, decide an option 
between propOSitions, whenever !!! is ~ genuine option ~ cannot £l . 
its nature ~ decided .2E: intellectual grounds; for to say, ~ ~ 
circumstances, liDo not decide, ~ leave ~ question open,tI is itself 
~ passional decision,--just like deciding yes £!'E£,--~ is attended 
wi th ~ risk of losing the truth. " 
When is it proper that the will should determine belief? James actually gives 
two answers. First, when abstinence from belief or suspension of judgment means 
losing the chance of truth, and so is equivalent to a disbelief which is no 
better proved by sensible fact than the positive or more fruitful belief. Sec-
ond, when the effect of conviction is to bring about the very facts which will 
verify it. 
To take the first case, he is saying that when we must make a decision, and 
we cannot make it on rational grounds, we are free to make it upon emotional 
grounds. If there is no better rational basis for accepting an hypothesis than 










providing we recognize that our decision is purely an emotional one. In sclen- . 
tific matters it is better to refuse to believe anything till all the evidence 
is in. But, as we noted in the second chapter, for James the really importa.."lt 
questions in ille are all beyond science. The individual's way of looking at 
things are all that he has for answering moral questions. When dealing with 
them he cannot wait till all the evidence is in, to make a decision. They con-
cern what does not now exiBt, what is in t.~e future, whereas science deals with 
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what is here and now. In fact, in personal and social relations maZV facts 
would never exist, were there not passion and faith prior to the fact, aiding 
to bring it about. This brings us to the second part or the argument f or the 
will to believe. 
Besides our right to believe in matters where science can give us no help, 
James affirms that belief that something is true may make it true when before 
I 
it was not so. In some few instances belief can thus run prior to fact and lead ' 
it where it will. A look at the subtleties involved in man's interpersonal 
relations will easily establish this. If the first time that 'you meet someone I 
you treat him as if he is your friend, when actually he is not, you may succeed I': 
inmak1ng him so. The young man who has lost his heart to a maid who conSiders! 
him but an acquaintance, may by the ardor of his persistent attentions touch 
her to the point where she may reciprocate his love. Or, to take the famous 
example that James set forth in the second essay of this work, one may decide 
that iife is not worth living and the pessimism induced from the decision will 
probably result in a life that is indeed not worth living. Or, one can adopt 
the faith that it indeed!.! worth living am through that determination make it 
so. The attitude, once taken and adhered to, creates its own verification in 
subsequent experience. 
The theory of meaning behind both these arguments for the will to believe 
is highly individualistic. If the belief makes a real difference in the life of 
the believer it must be accounted meaningful. But this does not mean that man l s 
non-intellectual life is to be left free to run wild, nor that man is not to be , 
rational in the ordinary course of what he believes. Perhaps more than any 
other aspect of his philosophy James' will to believe doctrine has been mis-
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understood by his critics. 
For James the will to believe is a ~ resort, something relied upon only 
when other means of attaining the truth are inadequate. What it arrives at 
must fit into the intricate and-complex mesh or truths that have preceded it. 
It also must produce results that by their richness and fertility will surfi-
ciently verify the meaningfulness and truth or the belief at hand. Furthermore, 
according to the doctrine or this essay, the will to believe is validly used 
only in the face or a genuine option--one that is liVing, r at"ced, and momentous. 
Often the option between losing truth and gaining it is not meme~tous. In such I 
a case one can wait. On less important choices man must search for objective 
evidence and refuse to make up his mind until it has come. This is the case 
with many of the occasions for belief in our everyday life; we simply suspend 
our judgment. 
In the case or scientific method the proper understand::! ng ot the objective I' 
matter at hand can be quite momentous. Does this mean that we must resat"t to ; 
the will to believe immediately and take a stand? No J because although the OP-'I~ 
, 
tion is momentous, it is seldom living or forced. In fact in most scientific I, 
I": 
experiments the mind must maintain an attitude or delicate balance between a I' 
hunch that the matter "is this way," am a conviction that the reality itself 
will reveal its nature without any help from one'a personal views. The more the 
observer can divorce himself from the matter observed, the more assured he can 
be of the objective validity or what he finds. 
Thus, viewed as James himself clearly saw it, the will to believe is not 
willful subjectivistic tool for fashioning all of one's private world. Rather, 
since man finds himself in a world where empirical method cannot solve all of 
69 
the problems that arise, one must have at hand a method that can be applied for 
those problems beyond science and its method, that nevertheless must be solved 
here and now, and whose solution will make a real difference in the life of the 
individual. 
Looked at in this light, the will to believe can be seen as a part of 
James' general pragmatic theory of meaning. That theory would embrace on one 
hand the pragmatism of radical empiricism, and on the other, the will to be-
lieve, a tough-minded theory and a tender-minded one. 
The rigid scientific arm of James' pragmatism holds that the way to under-
stand an idea is to envisage its possible consequences in experience. To grasp 
the full range of possible consequences of' a statement is to grasp the entire 
meaning of' the statement i tsel!. Where there are no consequences in experience 
there is no meaning. But strict adherence to such a norm would rule out very 
many phenomena that could give so much meaning to our lives. Therefore, there 
must be also a less rigid, tender-minded arm of' pragmatism. This is the (area 
for the exercise or the) will to believe. 
But, with the will to believe it is not the statement that must bave conse- , 
I 
I'i 
quences for experience if it is to be meaningful, but rather the believing of , 
the statement. Here one deduces the meaningful consequences not from the state- II 
ment, "God exists," but from the fact that someone believes it. If personal 
belief in God colors one's attitude toward life and makes a difference, then 'II 
:lli 
I' 
there is meaning. Here in the will to believe is an anthropocentrism even more :1 
" 
intense than Kant' B "Copernican Revolution." Unlike the tough-minded arm of 
James' pragmatism, the will to believe considers not the consequences of an 
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aspect or the will to believe will prove most important when James comes to 
apply it to the problem or free will. 
One of the most succinct formulations or James' will to believe argument 
is given in ~ Pluralistic Universe. There he sets forth in full the steps or 
what he calls his "faith-ladder." No clearer proof can be given that James en-
dorsed the will to believe throughout his philosophical career than its full 
elaboration in this volume less than a year be! ore his deathl 
A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is 
it true or not? you ask. 
It might be true somewhere, you say, for it i8 not self-contradictory. 
It mal be true, you continue, even here and now. 
It is ~ to be true, it would be ~,g: it ~~, it ought to 
be true, you presently feel. 
It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then 
--as a fInal result--
It shall be held for ~, you decide; it shall ~ as if true, for ycu", 
A.'1d your acting thus may in8 certain special cases be a means of mak- I 
ing it securely true in the end. 
To James it is clear that "not one step in this process is logical j n8 yet, 
it is no less desirable than logical thinking. This is not a way or thinking 
personal to himself J all or us operate this way, lIit is the way in which mOnists~i 
:11 
and pluralists alike espouse and hold fast to their visions."9 Some meJ:1.·may !li 
ill: 
care to affect utter rationalism in all of their livesJ however, in choosing !I 
I 
their visions, the things that really matter to them, they cannot ignore the iii! 
I
ii 
faot or IIlife exceeding logic," of "the practical reason for which the theoretiq: 
:111.1 
reason finds arguments after the conclusion is once there. tl9 
8A Pluralistic Universes Hibbert Lectures on the Present Situation in 
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Along with James let us now apply the will to believe to the problem of 
free will. In the very long, fifth chapter of the ~ to Believe he takes up 
the problem under the new heading, "The Dilenuna of Determinism." Given as an 
address to the Harvard divinity students in 1884 and published in the Unitarian 
Review in September of that year, this chapter represents the core argument that 
James had been using for Bome time ~th his determinist but very dear friend, 
Shadworth H. Hodgson. Their correspondence and bits of James' argument date 
back to at least five years before the 1884 address. There, as well as in the 
"Dilemma of Determinism" chapter, James refused to consider the problem as siln.-
ply a discussion of whether the will is free or not; rather, for him the prob-
lem must be situated, its implications must be looked full in the face. Other-
wise, this moral question of free ~11, like its psychological counterpart, 
would be unsolvable. Freedom vs. determinism is more clearly the struggle of 
pluralism vs. monism. In James' mind the disputants must realize and admit that 
it is a question of whether we live in an optimistic, passive, block-universe 
or in a world, fraught with peril, but alive and dynamic. In a letter dated 
Dec. 30, 1885 James accuses Hodgson of ignoring this fact, of accepting without 
any advertance the world as a "whole." 
The question of free will owes its entire being to a difficulty you 
disdain to notice, namely that we cannot rejoice in such a whole, for it 
is not a palatable optimism, and yet, if it be predeterr.unea, we must 
treatit as a whole. Indeterminism is the only way to break the world 
into good parts and into bad, and to stand by the former as against the 
1atter.10 . 
True to fOmi, James does not care to discuss the problem at all unless he 
can do so in terms of the realities we see about us in the world. \~hy does he 




want so badly to be able to break the world into good and bad parts? Here is 
his answer to Hodgsonl 
••• life is evil. Two souls are in my breast} I see the better, and. in 
the very act of seeing it I dQ the worse. To say that the molecules of 
the nebula implied this and shall ~ implied it to all eternity, so 
often as it recurs, is to condemn me to that "dilemma" of pessimism or 
subjectivism of which I once wrote, and which seems to have so little 
urgency to you; and to which all talk about abstractions erected into 
entities, am compulsion vs. "freedom," are simply irrelevant. What 
living man cares for such--niceties, when the real problem stares him in 
the face of how practically to meet a world foredone, with no possibilitie 
left in i t?l1 
Here we see the James of whom it was said in our second chapter that he 
had a need for unsureness, for novelty that is fraught with the danger of fail-
ure, for a complicated and unclear series of forces that left alone would prob-
ably lead to destruction. He did not so much reject determinism in general as 
monistic determinism, in which the world being all of one piece, must be ap-
proved or condemned as a unit. The moral will for him must have a pluralistic 
environment; firat, so that good may not be compromised with evil} secondly, so 
that one moral will is not compromised with another. With this second reason 
we see James' individualism combined with his pluralism. The world is "a sort 
of republican banquet • • • where all the qualities of being respect one an-
other's personal sacredness, yet sit at the common table of space and time.n12 
These different arguments, or various aspects of the same argument, must 
be studied more systematically for us to see clearly how James as a moral phU-
osopher resolved the problem of free will. To do this let us go back to the 
"Dilemma of Determinism" argument. Let us follow carefully the sweep of its 
llperry, vol. I, p. 6)2. 









thought. Let us scrutin1z~ carefully each thread that will be woven into the 
strong argument for freedom of the will within a pluralistic universe. This is 
James' central argument; it should be understood clearly before we move on to 
, .. -
consider complementary arguments, along with the consistency or James' thought 
concerning this problem up to the time of his death. 
James begins this fifth chapter with the firm assertion that the free-will 
controversy is very much alive today, that the "juice" of vigorous argument is 
present even more than in the past; he proves it by referring to all contempo-










.. .. " 
asserts: "I thuB disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove to J 
you that the freedom of the will is true. The most I hope is to induce some or 
you to follow my own example in assuming it true, and acting as if it were 
true.,,13 By such argumentation he shows that this chapter will fit well into 
the view and method of the Will ~ Believe. He then goes on to quote almost 
verbatim one of the first statements that he himself had made shortly after the 
successful outcome of the orisis of 1870. H ••• our first act of freedom, it 
we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free. H14 
Before setting forth his argumentation James gives two suppositions upon 
which his proofs will rest. They merely explicitate further the will to be-
lieve context within which he wishes to consider the problema 
••• first, when we make theories about the world and discuss them with 
one another, we do 80 in order to attain a oonception of things which sha.ll 
give us subjective satisfaction; and, second, if there be two conceptions, 
l3Ibid., p. 146 
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and the one seems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other I we 
are entitled to suppose that the more rational one is the truer of the 
two.15 . 
From the use that James makes of these suppositions it is clear that he wishes 
to assert from the very beginning that moral argwnents are equally as valid as 
scientific--in fact, within their own context they are to be preferred. -All 
our scientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods.1I16 For James 
freedom and variety are no ~ore subjective than necessity and uniformity, typi-
cal scientific postulates. 
As a final introductory note, James proclaims that he will not use the 
word, "freedom." Its eulogistic overtones, he fears, have blurred its meaning 
to the point where even determinists claim that their doctrine is but freedom 
properly understood. His friend, Hodgson, had certainly done this repeatedly. 
Rather, he resorts to the neater terms, "determinism" and "indeterminism." It 
remains only to define clearly the meaning at these words batore we can begin 
the argument. 
"Determinism professes that those parts of the universe alrea.d1' laid down 










'I' istic universe possibilities do not exist) there is only necessar,y fact ~nd . 
impo.sibility. P08sibiliti •• that fail to get realized aro pure illusiOlUl. Ii 
Chance, which asserts that a thing may fall out otherwise than it actually does, l( 
I' 
is in no way to be accepted. It contains an intrinsic irrationality and &Oci-
dentality. Once admit chance and your universe falls apart) there is nothitlt 
l5Ibid. 
l6Ibid., p. 147. 








'( I:' II!~ 
... • w .. _t'IC ., 0 ' '1M "iii'.' f .·0 .. • t " '&2 ** :e'8 
75 
but chaos. 
"Indeterminism • • • says that the parts @ the universi! have a certain 
amount or loose play on one another.a18 Actualities tloat in a sea ot possi-
bilities. The world is not "one unbending unit of tact,· but is a pluralism 
where real possibilities play some part in what will become tact. Chance means 
only f'that no part or the world can control absolutely the destinies of the 
whole.n19 It allows us to break up the universe into parts. It places man in 
a world where he has some role to play other than passive drifting with fact; 
it accounts more fully for man's inner need to fashion his future. Chance means 
nothing more, as far as man is concerned, than his indeterminate cfuture voli-
tions. 
The issues are now clear. Two opposing views of the world confront each 
other as contradictories; only one or them can be true. The reader, however J 
should not deceive himself; he is not to look for confirmatory evidence in re-
ality. "Postulates of reality," not scientific eVidence, separate the two views 
of the world. The argument will be decided by the personal meaning that can be 
derived from adoption of either view. 
To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it,--
to that man more rational with possib1lities excluded, and talk as 
we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us monists or 
pluralists, determi~ats or indeterminists, is at bottom always some 
sentiment like this. 0 
Science can only tell us that things have happened, mere fact, not that 50rne-
l8Ibid• 
19Ibid., p. 158. 
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thing else might or might not have happened in its place; and this is the l89'el 
upon which the argument for indeterminism must progress. 
James begins the argument proper with a consideration of the obvious fact 
of regret in the world. Regret implies that some action or fact is bad, re-
gretable, and this amounts to affirming that the fact ought not !:£ be. For a 
determinist to affirm that something ought not to be is to contradict himselt, 
since tlought" implies that it could have been otherwise; it implies indetermin-
ism. In the light of this it is quite clear that for a determinist to be con-
sis tent he must accept absolutely everything that he finds in the world as 
irrevocable, as part of the whole from all eternity. 
But every man, whatever side he takes in this controversy will admit that 
there is much of what ordinary men call "evil" in the world. A mother and 
father lose their six children as a locomotive destroys a packed school-bus. A 
man in cold blood smashes the skull of his wife as she lies wCWlded pleading 
with him to remember their moments of tenderness together. A young girl or 17, 
who has cleverly escaped to freedom in British Hong Kong, bitterly weeps that 
,there is no room for her, that she must be sent back to communist China where 
-in revenge she will be abused physically and morally. These are brutal facts 
that the determinist must accept as a determined part or his universe. Since 
f or him there is no II oughtJ' he must accept them as being equally as true and 
desirable for all time as the tender love that he experiences from his dear 
ones, the self-sacrifice he observes in his dedicated confreres, the life-
giving unity he derives from a belief in God. 
But the determinist is human, and in the face of the horrible evils that 
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worth living, his only response is pessimism. The true, consistent determinist, 
in the face of evil, is condemned to pessimism. 
Determinism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead, virtually 
defines the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible, 
--in other words, as an organism whose constitution is afflicted with 
an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw. • •• I see no escape from 
this pessimistic conclusion. • • .21 
The issue then is resolved to one of pessimism vs. human regret. If' the 
determinist could but hold bis philosophic views so tenaciously that he could 
crush all feelings of regret, then he might attain some comfort, and some con-
sistency. But alas~ This cannot be done. Those judgments continue to push 
themselves forward in our unguarded moments, and we see that flour determinism 
leads us to call our judgments of' regret wrong, because they are pessimistic 
in implying that what is impossible yet ought to be. tt22 
Thus, a true dilemma has developed for the determinist. The theoretical 
side of his life is opposed by the human, personal side. It seema that he is 
doomed to inconsistency: 
The theoretic and the active life thus playa kind or see-saw with each 
other on the ground of' evil. The rise of either sends the other down. 
Murder and treachery cannot be good without regret being bad. regret 
cannot be good without treachery and murder being bad. Both, however, are 
supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally unreason-
able, absurd, and wrong in the world. It must be a place of which either 
sin or error forms a necessary part. From this dilemma there seems at 
first sight no escape. Are we then BO soon to fall back into the pessi-
mism from which we thought we had emerged? And is there no possible way 
by which we may, with good intellectual consciences call the cruel ties ~I 
and the treacheries, the reluctances and the regrets, all good together?2) 
21rhe Will!2 Believe, P,E. Cit., p. 161. 
22Ibid ., p. 16). 








Or, in other words, is there no way by which the determinist can have an abso-
lute block-universe, and still be consistent--in the face of present evil in 
the world? 
.. r_ 
Yes, there seems to be a method, a vay out, by which the necessary evil 
acts we erroneously regret can be good, and also our error in so regretting 
them can also be good; it is called by James, subjectivism. 
Subjectivism has three branches,--we may call them scienticism, sen-
timentalism, and sensualism, respectively. They all agree essentially 
about the universe, in deeming that what happens there is subsidiary to 
what we think or feel about it. Crime justifies its criminality by awak-
ening our intelligences of that criminality, and eventually our remorses 
and regrets. • • • Its use is to quicken our sense of what the irretriev-
ably lost is. When we think of it as that which might have been ••• 
the quality of its worth speaks- to us with a wilder sweetness; and, con-
versely, the dissatisfaction wherewith we think of what seems to have 
driven it from its natural place gives us the severer pang. Admirable 
artifice of nature~ we might be tempted to exclaim,--deceiving us in or-
der the better to enlighten us, and leaving nothing undone to accentuate 
to our consciousness the yaWning distance of those opposite poles of good 
and evil between which creation Swings.24 
This is not a healthy subjectivistic approach to problems or lite that are be-
yond science, where the subject cannot divorce himself from the matter at hand. 
Rather, this is an insidious total subjectivism, where for the sake of conais-
tency, the determinist subjects all happenings that take place in the "out 
there" to their meaning and value for the private consciousness of the subject. 
Thus, the true dilemma or determinism is clear, the dileDfta to which James 
refers in the title of this essay. The truly reflective determinist is forced 
to choose, between total, crushing pessimism resultant upon the necessary evils 
of his blOCk-universe, or weak, sentimental subjectivism, reducing all reality 
to its cash-value in personal thrills and satisfactions. This is a dila~a 
24Ibid ., pp. 16,-166. 
.. 
19 
whose right horn is pessimism and mose lett horn is subjectirlsm. "If de-
terminisM is to escape pessimism, it must leave ort looking at the goods and 
ills or lite in a simple objective way, and regard them as materials inditter-
ent in themselves, tor the production or consciousness, scientific and ethical, 
in us.,,25 
To one who understands to some degree James' general philosophic approach 
to reality and the personal needs that called torth that approach, it should be 
clear that he could never opt tor either hom or this dilemma. To live within 
a necessary block-universe, where evil must be accepted as or one piece with 
good, never to be striven against, would be personally intolerable. Yet, to 
inhabit a purely personal world, possessed or no evil, where onets consciousness 
is the only reality, where action ot any sort is absurd, would lead to James' 
debility and the quenching or his desire to live. 
James felt constrained, therefore, at this point or the argwnent to pro-
claim boldly his personal credo, indeterminism. He would have nothing to do 
with determinism and the two horns or the dilemma that it called forth. Pess1-
~ is intolerable f or any man. In place or subjectivislll, and the cozy anti-
ceptic world that it wishes to create tor itself, James would gladly welcome 
a broken-up world full of evil aM' vice. "Not the absence ot vice, but vice 
there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal hwnan state.n26 
As James sees it, subjectivism, and thus determinism, is to be ruled out 
on many counts. It leads to corruption; it makes the passive man all the more 
25Ibid., p. 166. 




passive, and causes the active to seem as madmen. Why do anything for this 
world of ours, if one I s consciousness can be stimulated as easily by passive 
reception or what the flow of events brings? Subjectivism fosters the fat&!-
istic cast or mind. By so doing, it encourages men shamefully to pour forth 
their energies in every type of spiritual, moral, and practical license. Or, 
for the less spirited, it offers the lotus delights of doing nothing in a 
comfortable cosmos made ot bland goodness. 
From the crushing defeat of pess1misa and the grand elusions orsubjec-
tivi51ll James offers a third way, that ot action. In answer to the two camps 
or determinists he effectively quotea Carlyle: "Hang your sensibilitiesl Stop 
your snivelling complaints, and your equally snivelling rapturesl Leave off 
your general emotional tomt'oolery, and get to WCRK like men\1I27 He expresses 
his own very personal convictions in less direct fashion: 
No matter how we feel; if we are only ta1thfulin the outward act and re-
fuse to do wrong, the world will in so tar be sate, and we quit or our 
debt toward it. Take, then, the yoke upon our shoulders; bend our neck 
beneath the heavy legality of its weight; regard something else than our 
feeling as our limit, our master, and our law; be willing to live and die 
in its service,--and, at a stroke, we have passed from the subjective into 
the objective philosophy of things, much as one awakens from same feverish 
dream, full of bad lights and noises, to find one l s self bathed in the 
sacred coolness and quiet of the air of the night.28 






recognition of one's limits in the face or evil and the :i.mmensity or the task, 
that lies before us. Secondly, it lies in the trust that, after bringing about 
same external good, we can be at peace with the knowledge that at least we have 
27Ibid., p. 174. 
28Ibid., p. 174. 
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done something, and that tittle "something" has made a d1.tference. Further, 
we must remember that "our responsibility ends with the performance of that 
duty, and the burden of the rest we may lay on higher povers.n29 
In addition to his rejection of the dilemma of determinism, James offers a 
further argument in favor of his indeterministic view of the world. He recalls 
to our minds the obvious fact that men spend their lives working vigorously for 
various causes. As parts of the universe they are clearly art ecting other 
parts. In their work they often achieve what they call It success," with its 
accompanying joy and sense or accomplishment. Also, at times, they "fail," and 
feel that this is bad. How, explain all these patent tacts and clear experi-
ences? Indeterminism seems the only ways 
• • • the only consistent way of representing a pluralism and a world 
whose parts may affect one another, through their conduct being either 
good or bad, is the indeterministic way. What interest, zest, or excite-
ment can there be in achieving the right way, unless we are enabled to 
feel that the wrong way is also a possible and natural way,--n&y, more, 
a menacing and imminent way? And what sense can there be in condemning 
ourselves tor taking the wrong way, unless we need have done nothing or 
the sort, unless the right way was open to us as well. • •• Only then 
is it other than a mockery to teel, after we have failed to do our best, 
that an irreparable opportunity is ~one from the universe, the loss of 
which it must forever atter mourn.) 
Only indeterminism can explain the experiences that ve as men have in our daily 
lives. And along with indeterminism, James asserts, we must now accept all 
that accompanies it, possibilities, chance, pluralism. 
With his argument completed, James moves on in the last part of the chap-
ter to consider two typical objections :that are UBually urged against plural-
29Ibid., p. 175. 




istic indeterminism; first, that' chance and pluralism, once allowed 88 part of 
the universe, will lead to utter chaos where "anything goes," to the swift de-
struction of the very order that it claims to respect; second, that chance is 
incompatible with divine providence, which is a meaningful beliet tor many 
people, and therefore, to be respected. 
In answer to the second objection James attirms that as long as you do 
not restrict the providence to "fulminating nothing but fatal decrees,.)l then 
you can "allow him to provide possibilities as well as actualities to the uni-
verse, and to carry on his own thinking in those t\JO categories just as we do 






• • !t 
.... 
"-",,, 
III ':: ~. ' 
.' , 
.. , , 
..' - ' 
... ~, 
,.:.. 
'" .' :--. ~.~~ 





chess player who sits down to play with a novice. He intends to win; he cannot , 
foresee exactly every actual move that his opponent \Jill make. But, he knows 
all the possible moves of the novice, and he knows in advance how to meet each 
of them. Thus, victory infallibly arrivesJ he infallibly directs the course 
of events to come out to the end that he wants, leaving the choice of possible 
actions to his novice adversary. So also is the case wi th God and man. 
In answer to the first objection, the destructive aspects of chance, James 
aftirms that "chance means pluralism and nothing more,")) and. then goes on to 
declare that 
If some of the members of the pluralism are bad, the philosophy of plural-
ism, whatever broad views it may deny me, permits me, at least, to turn 
to the other members with a clean breast of affection and an unsophisti-
cated moral sense. And if I still wish to think of the world as a total-
31Ibid• , p. 180. 
32Ibid• , p. 181. 
33rbid. , p. 178. 
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ity, it lets me feel that a world with a cnance in it of being altogether 
good, even if the chang~ never come to pass, is better than a world with 
no such chance at all.>4 
In an effort to clarify matters for his objectors, and to win them to his way 
of viewing the matter, James goes further to specify just what kind of chance 
he means-to opt for. 
Just this,--the chance that in moral respects the future may be other 
and better than the past has been. This the only chance we have any 
motive for supposing to exist. Shame, rather, on its repudiation and 
its deniaH For its presence i!J!l the vital. air which lets the world live, 
the salt which keeps it sweet.)' 
Thus, James completely turns the table on his adversaries. Chance is not de-
structive, but those who repudiate it are. It is our only hope, and those who 
deny it, either do not understand it, or are blinded by their deterministic 
views. 
James concludes "The Dilemma of Determinism" with this little argumentl 
he urges his reader (or listener) to assume along with him that determinism is 
the correct view of the universe. "If it be so, may you and I then have been 
foredoomed to the error or continuing to believe in liberty. It is fortunate 
f or the winding up or controversy that in every discussion wi ton determinism 
this argmnentum ~ hominem can be its adversary's last word.",36 
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this fifth chapter of the!if!l ~ Believe, let us reconsider it in the context ,~, , 
of the main purpose of this thesis. It is oUr aim here to praY'e clearly that 
34Ibid• 
35Ibid., p. 179. 
36Ibid., p. 163. 
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James resolved the determinism vs. indeterminism controversy in favor of free-
dom, that as a moral. philosopher he unreservedly believed in the doctrine of 
free will. "The Dilemma of Determinism," his main argument to that effect, was 
written in the middle 80' s • The question arises. Did James hold this view for 
the rest of his life? In his writings can evidence be round that, tor the 
twenty-aix years left to him after that address to the divinity students at 
Harvard, he continued to exercise his will in favor of the will' a freedom? 
Yes, evidence can be found. Let us study it briefly and evaluate it. 
Before that address of 1884 we see that James had been considering the 
problem. In 1876 he accepted from Renouvier a proof affirming that thinking 
must be free if it is to be either true or talse. It can mean nothing, as 
James sees it, to discuss the question of freedom unless you are tree to affirm 
or deny it. He put it this waya "In wery wide theoretical conclusion we must 
seem more or less arbitrarily to choose our side. • •• But it our choice is 
truly free, then the only poasible way of getting at that truth is by the exer-
cise of the freedom which it impl1es."37 
In 1882, in a letter to Charles Renouvier, he again expresses his beliet 
in freedom of the will, and this time views it as a moral postulate. 
I believe, more and more, that free will ••• must be accepted &8 a post-
ulate in justification of our moral judgment that certain things already 
done might have been better done. This implies that something different 
was possible in their place. The determinist, who calls this judgment 
false, cannot consistently mean that so far as it actually was rendered, 
a truer judgment could have been in its place. • • • The only way in 
which he can save the rationality of~e world to his own mind, is by 
taking refuge in an absolute optimistic faith which says the world as a 
whole is the richer and better for having had that error, that evil, in 






it at that particular place and t1me.38 
In Talks ~ Teachers, a little-known work or James' published lS years 
after the "Dilemma of Determinism" address, we see James the psychologist 
stressing the short-lived quality or voluntary attention, and explaining what 
will is. He stops his explanation to affirm definitely that PI myself' hold 
with the free-willists •••• "39 His reasons for this supply us with another 
argument, varying slightly from those we have seen thus far; he opts for free-
dom, "not because I cannot conceive the fatalist theory clear1:,y, or because I 
fail to understand its plausib1lity, but simply because, if free will!!!:! true, 
it would be absurd to have the belief in it fatally forced on our acceptanceJt 40 
Suppose free will to be true; then the situation as we truly find it, with 
people believing as they wish and with James declaring firmly for freedom, is 
explainable. James affirms that he can hold this view "with the best of scien-
titic consciences, knowing that the predetennination of the amount of my effort 
of attention can never receive objective proof •••• nUl 
Let us move now to a consideration or the more philosophical writings that 
flowed from James' pen in that very important last decade at his lite. It is to 
this decade that we are entirely indebted tor &Il7 "system" that 18 p!"esent in 
James' thought. 
In the college year, 1902-1903, James set his fundamental. thoughts in order 
38Perry, vol. I, pp. 682-683. 
39Ta1ks to Teachers ~ Psychologrl 
Ideals, New York, 1899, p. 191. 
4Orbid., p. 191.192. 
LIIbid., p. 192. 
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for a course in liThe Philosophy or Nature- (Philosophy J). Although the syl-
labus that he prepared for this course consists in large part only or headings, 
it is considered by Perry to be "perhaps the most comprehensive statement or 
his philosophy that James ever made. 1142 The central theme of that syllabus was 
James' doctrine or "tychism." 
James seems to equate tychism there with "freedom, chance, necessity, 
truth, fact," as "ultimate terms.,,4J Tychism is the name that he uses for the 
piecemeal data or our pluralistic universe, along with what those data imply 
about the plan of the universe as a whole. For our purposes here, we are justi-
fied in saying that tychism is freedom expanded to ~ status or ! cosmological 
~; it is the spontaneous, chance-like aspect of all or reality. Thus, the 
reasons in tychism's favor that James gives there are, in some sense, the rea-
sons in freedom's favor--at least in freedom as a chance-like aspect of all be-
ings, conscious or otherwise. 
I. Scientific reasons I 
1. No concrete experience ever repeats itself •••• 
2. We fail to absolutely exclude originality, by assuming that ele-
ments only repeat. Repeat what? -- original elements and modelst 
3. Our own decisions suggest what !lcoming into existence" might be 
like: "Chancel! from without, self-sufficing life from Within. ~ comes 
is determined only when it comes. Ab extra it appears only as a possible 
gift or IIgraft." -
II. Moral reasons: 
1. Absolutely to deny novelty, as Monism does, and to assume that the 
universe has exhausted its spontaneity in one act, shocks our sense or 
life. 
2. Tychism, essentially pluralistic, goes with empiriCism, personal-


















43The syllabus can be found in Perry, vol. II, as the ninth appendix. The 
quotes are from p. 141. I, 
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, ism, democracy, and freedom •••• 
III. Metaphysical reasons: . 
1. Tychism eliminates the "problEm of evil" from theology. 
2. It has affinities with common-sense in representing the Divine as 
finite. 
3. It avoids Monism's doubling-up of the wprld into two editions, the 
Finite repeating the Absolute in inferior form. 44 
We find contained here m~ strains of James' thought a pluralism (I, 2), 
psychological verification (I, 3), the will to believe (II, 1), the dilemma of 
determinism (III, 1), radical empiricism (III, 3). It seems that our own view 
of the centrality of freedom to James' thought also receives some confirmation. 
Like empiricism or pluralism, tychism is applicable to James' philosophy as a 
whole, "turning up that side of it which proclaims the spontaneity and unexpec-
tedness of things.n45 
In December 1904 James delivered the President's Address before the 
American Psychological Association in Philadelphia, which later came to be 
published in Essays !!! Radical Empiricism as liThe Experience or Activity." 
James halts the train of thought of this essay to clarify for his colleagues, 
by means of a long footnote, some misunderstandings that seem to have arisen 
concerning his view of free will, thus offering us a stUl later instance of 
his views concerning this matter .46 
"Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with e1'tort as we go, hanging 
44Ibid., pp. 748-749. 
45perry, vol. II, p. 663. 
46Though Essay~ 1n Rgdicat Empiricism is posthumously published, this lec-
ture saw print in January, 19 , in the Psychological Review, at which time 
James must have inserted the footnote. 
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on, and finally achieving our intentione-this !! action"n47 and this is all that 
it is, James affirms. Action is simply factual causality" Dot "the bare illuso-
ry surface of a world whose real causality is an unimag~ble ontological prin-
ciple hidden in the cubic deeps. • • ~"48 James in no way wishes to assert a 
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phenomenon the experience of activity that accompanies our personal' operations. ,~, 
Such a view would contradict his radical empiricism. He feels that others' 
beliefs that he holds such a metaphysical principle arises from the misinterpre-
tation of what he has said in the Principles of effort and will. 
James claims that he has always opted for the phenomenalist approach as 
opposed to the trans-phenomenal. As proof, he affirms that he owes all his 
doctrine on eff ort and will to Renouvier, who is an II out and out phenomenist 
• • • ."49 Whoever interprets him otherwise has been reading bits of state-
ments out of their context. He goes on to say" 
The misinterpretation probably arose at first trOll -.r:I cletend.1Dg (atter 
Renouvier) the indeterminism of our efforts. 'Free willi was supposed 
by my critics to involve a supernatural agent. As a matter of plain 
history the only 'free will' I have ever thought of defending is the 
character of novelty in fresh activity-situations •••• Activity-
,si tua tions come • • • each with an original. touch. A.' principle' of free 
will if there were one, would doubtless manifest itself in such phenomena, 
but I never saw, nor do I nO~J see, what the principle could do except~ 
rehearse the phenomenon beforehand, or why it ever shoul~ be invoked.~O 
James I check upon the interpretations of hi!! colleagues (and our interpre-
47Essaya in Radical Empiricism, OPe cit." p. 183. 
48Ibid ., p. 184. 
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tation) is important here. To consider hia statements concerning tychiSlll, 
treedom of the will, spontaneity and chance, as anything more than affirmations 
ot a universal fact, is to miss the basic trend ot his thought. James saw am 
admitted nothing more than fact, both in his psychology and his moral philoso-
phy. To adrni t anything from a trans-phenomenal world as Significant is to con-
tradict radically his distinctive radical empiricism. 
Pragmatisms ! ~ ~ !2! ~ ~ Ways ot Thinking appeared in 1907, a 





















of truth. In the third chapter where there are "Some Metaphysical. Problems "'} 
Pragmatically Considered," we find a brier discussion of free will. Some peopl 
assert freedom of the will, James says, solely for the dignity that it lends to 
man; man can originate and direct his future, they believe, and his dignity is 
much enhanced thereby. Let us rather determine the pragmatic meaning of free-
dom, its possible consequences in our experience. 
"Free-will pragmatically means novelties!!! !!!! world, the right to ex-
pect that in its deepest elements as well as in ita surface phenOJlena, the 
future may not identically repeat and imitate the past.uS! The result of this 
is the melioristic doctrine that we spoke or in our second chapter, and the 
general cosmological theory or promise. tiThe only possibility that one can 
rationally claim is the possibility that things may be better."S2 
Free will thuB becomes a doctrine of relief', a gospel; it takes on a re-
ligious character, leading man on to greater efforts on behalf or an improving 
universe. "our spirit, shut within this courtyard of sense-experience, is 
51Pragmatism, ~. ~., pp. 118-119. 





always saying to the intellect upon the tower: 'Watchman, tell us or the 
night, if it aught of promise bear,- and the intellect gives it then these 
terms of pranise.H53 By tenacious belie! in freedom of the will, the intellect 
gives to our spirit the strength to find its way safely through life's perUse 
Thus, free will ~ passed the test or pragmatism; it is of great practi-
cal significance. If we bear belief in free will into the darkness of life's 
thicket, "there grows light about us.n54 
To advance by two more years our study or the consistency and tenacity at 
James' option for freedom, we see him considering the argument in Pragmatism's 
sequel, .'!!!! Meaning ~ Truth, 1909. Here the discussion differs somewhat in 
that it is carried on within a time-context; it centers, however, on the stock 
objection of determinism, that freedom am novelty will lead to chaos, disorder, 
or as expressed here, to a "breach between the past and future." James' answer: 
F or the indeterminist there is at all times enough past for all the dif-
ferent futures in Sight, and more besides, to find their reasons in it, 
and whichever future comes will slide out of that past as easily as the 
train slides by the switch. The world, in short, is just as continuous 
with itself for the believers in free will as for the rigorous determin-
ists, onIy the latter are unable to believe in points of bifurcations 
as spots of really iIXiifferent equilibrium or as containing shunts which 
there--and there gnly, ~ before--direct existing motions without alter-
ing their a.mount.~5 . 
One final work of James' must be studied before we can consider complete 
our exposition of his full views concerning free will. ~ Problems of ~­
osopby' was begun by James on March 26, 1909, and was continued intermittently 
5.3Ibid., p. 121. 
54Ibid. 



















up t~ the time of his death. August 26. 1910. It va8 never completed. but 
James left written instructioM to have it pubUshedt "Say it is fragmentary 
and unrevised. • • • Say that I hoped by it to round out my system. which now 
is too much like an arch built only on-one side.n$6 Designed to serve as a 
college textbook with a wide oiroulation. the book was dedicated to Charles 
Renouvier; thus, James ended his philosophioal oareer invoking the man with 
whom he began it. 
Aside from some general remarks concerning human causation, ~ Problems 
~ Philosophy does not oonsider man's will or its freedom. Nevertheless, it 
must be oonsidered here, in that it illustrates up to the time of his death 
James' oentral oonoern for novelty as a cosmologioal reality. The first eight 
chapters of the book follow the syllabus of a oourse James taught at Stanford 
University in 1906; they deal with questions that James had treated elsewhere, 
and center about a study of "percepts and conoepts." It is in the remaining 
five chapters of the volume that novelty is 8tudied in a striking way, and more 
profoundly than had hitherto been the case. This study is made in oonnection 
with two of the ola.ssic problems of philosophy. the paradoxes of intini ty and 
continuity, and the nature of causality. 
The newness of what James is saying here oonsiats in hiB eubstitution of 
novelty for his earlier tych1Bl1l. Perry says that "James came to look upon his 
earliest tychism, with its emphasis on sheer chanoe, as only a negative forM of 
intellectualism. • • • The paradox of tyehism--its odiousness to the philo-
sophie mind--liea in its leaving even adjacent existence in a state of total 
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irrelevance one to another.1I57 James put in its place a novelty "which, when 
it comes, seems natural and reasonable, like the tu.l!Ulment of a tendency. 
This notion of a 'really growing world' is the general theme or the latter 
part of the Problems .2£ Philosophy, the theme which bound him closely to Berg-
son, and the theme with which he was increasingly occupied during the last years 
and months of his life ... 58 
Thus, we see that up to the very time at his death James' mind was ot one 
piece with regard to free will, whether he grappled with the problem of human 
freedom itself, or was busy discussing the qualities or the pluralistic uni-
verse within which that freedom must tit. 
To summarize the various arguments that we have gleaned from his philo-
sophical writings, we see that (1) James viewed the controversy primarily in 
the context of a "Dilemma of Determinism." In the Will to Believe he showed 
that pessimism and subjectivism are two equally undesirable horns ot a dilemma 
that can only be avoided by rejecting the general doctrine that gives birth to 
them. (2) In that same essay, we are given a secondary argument, showing that 
indeterminism is the only consistent explanation for the feelings of zestful 
joy and sadness to which men are prone as the result or their respeotive suc-
cesses and fallures. (3) In 1876 James accepted from Renouvier a further proof 
to the effect that our thinking must be tree if' it is to be true or false. 
(4) James viewed freedom of the will in 1882 as a postulate in justification at 
our moral jUdgment that certain things alreaqy done might have been done better, 

















(5) whereas in Talks !2. Teachers it amounts to little more than a useful 
supposition that will never be proven wrong. 
(6) The Syllabus of Philosophy 3 (1902-1903) renders freedom as a cosmolog-
~ ~J under the guise or tychism it can marshall a host or scientific, 
moral, and metaphysical proof's in its behalf'. (7) We are indebted to the brier 
section of Essays in Radical Empiricism tor a clarification and check upon our 
possible misinterpretation of' tree will. It is not a metaphysical principle 
that would render our conscious experience or action a mere epiphenomenon; 
rather, it is a universal experienceable fact--and nothing more. (8) Further-
~ . 
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more , it is clear that free will has pragmatic meaning as is clearly shown in! ~ 
Pragmatism, and its sequel, (9) here in terms of' its assurance or our smooth 
passage from past to future, while its adversary cannot handle the obvious 
fact of bifurcation of' future choices. 
(10) Finally, we have seen that nen up to h1. ve17 death Jaua was deeply 
concerned with noveltl, that notion of' a -reaJ.l.y growing world," that central 
quality or the pluralistic universe w1~ which thetreedom of' man's will must 
fit. 
In the light or thes. 118117 arguments, acme of which are h~ distinct, 
it should be clear that as a moral philoaopher Jamea exerciaed the tree w1ll 
that he believed in, to opt for his right and vill to believe in the freedom at 
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CHAPl'ER FIVE 
- REMARKS 
Some observations concerning James· solution of the treedom vs. determinism 
controversy and the methods he used to arrive at that solution seem to be in 
order. This is th e aim of our tinal chapter. 
We might begin by remarking that James did well in refusing to resolve the 
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in a single "tree act." Surely, that data cannot be simply accepted as conf'irm- :,: I 
atory of either determinism or freedom; it must be -interpreted" in some sense. 
Furthermore, determinists seem to be able always to carry the day, if the dis-
cussion is solely on the level of particular instances of free acts. They can 
point to some determinants (as surely there are always some in every- choice-
. -
Situation) and then affirm that we are merely ignorant or the total range of 
determinants, that we deceive ourselves in claiming to experience tree choice, 
much as James· talking river deceives itself in thinking that it willtully flows 
against the general current, when really it only redounds otf a log-jam with 
the force supplied it by the general. flow. l 
James certainly contributed to the controversy by his insistence upon its 
taking place wi thin a wider context. In this he was much like some contemporary 
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philosophers and psychologists who strive to define freedom in terms or the 
whole man and his Lebenswelt. While not denying the validity or demonstrating 
the existence of human freedom from particular examples, like James they insist 
that for the controversy to be meaningful it must be carried on within a con-
text of subjectivity. 
Their "subjectivism," however, differs considerably from James'. For them 
the term denotes a methodology whereby man learns to assess himself, his life-
world, and the inter-relationships between the two, in the ver7 process or his 











self. From his experience of fundamental insertion into the world (Dasein) and :; i 
openness to potentialities, and from his appropriation of many of the,objects 
of that world into his own personal life-world, man is aware--undeniably--of 
his inner autonomy, his inner directedness and freedom. Since he is free, man's 
life-world, an exteneion or himself, is also free. These two facts, man's inner 
autonomy as an operating subject and his life-world, are all that 8.D.7 man can 
be aware of in human existence. Since both are experienced as free, we can say 
that manl s entire lite is a manifestation to himself or freedom. 
In so far as man can choose to use that freedom to develop hills.It, not at 
random or with no particular end in view, but according to a basic orientation 
and plan, and in so far as he can decide to order more and more all his actions 
to the realization of this goal, it can be said that man has a basic liberty or 
action, that he is in his actions an embodiment of a fundamental freedom. 
In canparison, the subjectivism of James' will to believe argwnent can 
seem pale and lifeless} nevertheless, his olear option for belief in freedom 







than the rationaJ.ism and selectiv1ty of many or his contemporaries. The obser-
vations offered here concerning James' tinal solution at the freedom vs. deter-
minism controversy will tall into two parts, those concerning what he had to 
say of the matter in the Principles E!. Psychology, and those treating the will 
to believe methodology. Any criticism will be internal) that is, it will be 
based upon the internal consistency or James' thought and the logical presuppo-
sitions behind that thought. 
Within the Principles the only norm. that James cared to use for the admit-
tance or data was the conscious awareness, atter introspection, ot ps.ychologi-
cal and physiological phenomena within himself or the subject. Application or 
this norm allowed him boldly to strike out against the "feeling of innervation" 
theory that had received the approval or the conventional wisdom of the time. 
James said quite simply that upon reflection he found no feeling of innervation 
prior to his acts) the only feeling present was that sent back (accompanying 
-
afferent, therefore, not efferent impulses) by the muscle as it tunctions. We 
are not conscious of anything but the operating muscles. Thus, if we are aware 
as that. 
We see James applying this canon of parsimony elsewhere when he affirms 
that "it we admit ••• that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they 
exist atter the fashion in whiCh they appear."2 This viewpoint is but the re-
sult of the arrival or psychology to the status or an empirical science. It 
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is something that we have oome to take for granted wi thin the science today, 
but which had not been fully realized by its promoters bet ore the turn or the 
century. 
. -
What is surprising is the fact that this norm was not applied consistently 
throughout the Principles. In tact, on arriving within the "Will" and flAtten-
tion" chapters at the very point of concern to this thesis, James refuses to 
apply the nonn. The question as to the will's freedom is not decided there by 
the norm of conscious awareness. James had discussed earlier the obvious fact 
of difficult, painful decisions, where the dead heave of the will seems to be 
the only determinant. He bad even affirmed that at times it seems !.! if we are 















Yet, strangely the matter is no longer decided by the simple use of this" 
norm, as with the debunking of the "feeling of innervation" theory. Now there 
is a strong possibility that, although we are not consciously aware of it, 
attention is a mere resultant, not a force. As James sees it, there is a chame 
that the feeling or eftort, ot which we are consciously aware, is deceptive, 
hiding from us the tact that, though we are not aware of it, it is merely an 
inert accompaniment to the painful action; 1t 11 brain energy that has been 
neutralized by the presence of the idea of the easier thing aDd converted into 






feeling of effort. The stream of our thought could be like a jammed-up river, .~ 
which erroneously thinks that it is willfully causing little eodles to flow 
against the general current; 1t teels the pressure exerted by the barriers and 
is convinced, therefore, that it is the source of the eddies. The real fact is 
that the downward force of the stream supplies tQ.t energy for the eddies, am 
the pressure is merely the passive index that the teat is being performed. 
............. ____ ...... _--...... _liliiii7 •• 'IIII .... II'.'5.S __________ > .. '- .~'.liic'>.Y"iiiSiilll'" iliT1iii11~F_ii5 _______ III!',i'-', 
If this kind of thinking had been maintained throughout, James would not 
have been able to oppose the "feeling or innervation" theo1'7. There is a very 
strong possibility that it is there, even though we are not consciously aware of 
it--especially since such eminent authorities as Wundt and Bain were defending 
it. Within this controversy James takes the presence of a feeling of ef'fort 
(and nothing else) as the final determinant of the argwnent, and 'yet when he 
discusses the will's freedom it is not enough. There seems to be a real incon-
siatency in the use of methodology here. 
Furthermore, in calling into question the probative force of the conscious 
awareness of his own acts, James is denying himself' the only real criterion 
possible for substantiating anything about man. There may be eight or ten (or 
10,000) possible explanations for each of the psychic occurances within man, 
but each is consciously experienced fundamentally in only one way by all men. 
To demand more than this experience r or verification of an expla.n&tion is to 
deny oneself the possibility of affirming anything definite about man and the 
nature of his operations. 
Yet, a word in James' defense should be inserted here. In man's conscious 
experience he otten cannot tell whether a recent action 18 the result of a tree 
choice on his part or the pull of interest inherent in the object of the action. 
Or, as expressed above, whether the "live" TV camera is manned by a cameraman 
or pulled here and there b.1 scenes and objects naturally photogenic? Since 
there are times that conscious experience really cannot settle a problem for 
man--and the ,moment of human decision is one-.. perhaps James was not so far orr 
in refusing to apply it to the problem or freedom. 
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iug the will in a wider context, man ~ have power over and is responsible 
f or his wider context of interests. By a series of single acts, which may or 
may not be free, he can strive for a basic goal or orientation within himself. 
The more he orders all his single actions to the realization of this goal, the 
sooner he will become and be that which he wishes to be. Man is free fundamen-
tally to become internally what he desires. This freedom in a larger sense is 
experienced by all men. James himself utilized it when he decided to struggle 
against his neurasthenia and to "become and be" an active man. 
A plausible explanation for the evident volte-~ within the Principles, 
James I refusal to use conscious experience at one time after having used it 
earlier, lies in the fact that he considered freedom predominantly as a phil-
osophical problem, wherein criteria for psychological proof would not suffice. 
On the other ham, the "feeling of irmervation" theory was probably never con-
sidered by him except in the context of psychology and its criteria for verifi-
ttF:t··I~ 
























cation. This explanation brings to the fore the strange blend of philosophy ·1 
and psychology within the Principles, a secood weakness of this work and one 
involving will-cloctrine itself and its 1.lIplications tor tr •• dca. 
Although in the Principles James trequently asserts his bellef in treedOll 
and the gospel of effort, the general result of the psychology or the will 
therein exposed is strangely close to automatism. Ideo-motor action, which 
supplies the ~-determ1nation of a particular idea of action, is almost COlll-
pletely an automatic operation. No sooner are afferent nerve impulses relayed 
to the brain,. then, if the idea is clearly attended to, they are issued forth 
as efferent impulses to the muscle cells. The ~-determination is supplied 
by consent, the ideal 8 filline up or the mind. Granted that Jwnes never states 
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clearly what brings about consent, whether a quality inherent in the idea 
(determinism) or in the subject himself (freedom). The general impression 
created by an idea's filling up of the mind, however, is one of man helplessl, 
urged and checked b.1 the power of ideas in full possession of his consciousness. 
James' strong assertion of belief in freedom seems rather weak in the face 
of the implications consistentl7 flowing frem the various aspects of his will-
theory of automatism. His psychology seems to clash with his philosophy (and 
within the same work), yet James never felt called upon to resolve the clash 
or remove the philosop~. In writing the PrinCiples he strove to avoid labora-
tory psychology; he hoped to put in its place one teeming with the immediac1 or 
everyday experience, a psychology that would be empirical and yet of interest 
to the "intelligent layman.n The result of this is that James dabbled in phil-
osophy as he wrote psychology. 
Though there was a clash of doctrine concerning the vUl's freedom, James 
allowed it to stand. He refused to accept as evidence for a further question 
what he arrived at as a psychologist. He could see no other methodology, no 
other level of explanation, than that which he used as a psychologist; thus, at 
the completion of his empirical study' or the will, he merel7 asserted his phU-
osophical preferences for freedom and pushed on. Having observed these wealc-
nesses in James' discussion of freedom within the Principles--the use and non-
use of conscious experience as a criterion, and the strange conflicting blend 
of psychology and philosophy--Iet us go to the second part of our observations 
on James' treatment of freedom, those concerning his will to believe methodology. 
The will to believe is but one of two methods that James used as a phil-
osopher; it is the tender-minded arm of his pragmatic method. His tout>h-m1ndef! 
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pragmatism flows from the phenomenalism that served him well as an empirical. 
psychologist. But, within certain areas of phUosophy--those furthest fran 
empirical verification--this phenomenalism narrows the limits of certainty 
almost to nil; therefore, the only way to settle matters is by means of a will 
decision, by belief • 
James the scientist seamed unusually disturbed at the presence of the 
subject to his own thought. He felt that there are but two ways of resolving 
a problem, the objective, verifiable, scientific method and the subjective, 
willful, second-best method, utilized only because it shows results. Tha sci-
entist, the philosopher must handle what problems be can with the scientific 
method, radical empiricism, James' tough-minded pragmatism. But, sad to say, 
there are some problems that cannot be subjected to this D3thod. Insufficient 
evidence, the presence of the subject to the matter at hand, the impossibility 
of empirical verifioation, invalidate a rational handling of the situation. 
It is for this type of problem that James' tender-minded pragmatism, hiB will 
to believe, seemed so sucoessful. 
The question that seems worth raising here is whether these are the only 
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ful belief. James' convictioll8 concerning the presence or the individual sub- . 'I 
ject to his philosophical reasonings are certainly cogent. It JIlust be admitted 
that individual aspects or personal attention truly structure much of man's 
knowing. They influence the selection of data to be considered and thus the 
very act of understanding itself J furthezmore, they have a say in what is to be 
considered just verification. The subject is certainly very much present to 
much of his thought. But, one is driven further to ask, i8 it right to assume 
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that the individual philosopher can only" resort to a willful decision to be- ,j 
lieve? 
Herein lies a real problem with James' will to believe methodology. Be-
llef in a view or reality that can lend meaning to one's future actions is 
clearly desirable (James always demanded that that belief tit into the mesh or 
truths that ~ empirically verified), but is the philosopher so easily to give 
up the hope of attaining some rational philosophical method that will methodi-
cally produce truths that are absolute and objective? In fact, does not the 
presence of a further question, atter some empirical truths have been arrived 
at, plead for the existence or a further methodology to handle that question? 
To resort to the will is to kill or ignore the question. It seems that there 
are more tools available to the philosopher than the two that James considered) 
and the ceaseless striving to answer further Q.uestions b7 Mans of a distinc-
tively philosophical method is more Jamesian than James hiluelt. 
One final reservation must be mentioned with regard to James' will to be-
lieve. Pointed out to James by Al-thur O. Lovejoy) and cle8Z'ly explained more 
recently by Paul Henle or the University of Michigan,4 it concerns the will to 
believe as a theory or meaning. 
To take the example of belief in God, James affirms, according to the will 
to believe, that it this belief arfects a person's emotional outlook and mode 
3 Cf. Perry, vol. II, pp. 480-485. 
4In his introductory essay to the James selections in Max H. t'uch, Classic 
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of action then there is meaning present. But lihere does the meaning of the 
bare statement "God exists" come frC1l4? This statement must have meaning in 
itself before it can be believed. James says that the neaning comes from the 
very believing of it; but, this is impossible since then one would believe in 
something that has no meaning in itsell. The statement cannot have meaning 
according to James' tough-minded pragmatic method either, since there is no 
possible experimental test f or the existence of God. 
According to James then a statement is maningtul it it has experimental 
consequences (tough-minded radical empiricism), or if in itself it has no such 
consequences but believing it has experimental. consequences (tender-minded will 
to believe). In the first case the experimental consequences constitute the 
meaning, but in the second case there is ~ explanation of what constitutes the 
meaning. James merely says that it it "makes a difference" to the individual 
believer, there is meaning present. 
That James was aware of this difficulty we have proof from a letter to 
Professor Lovejoy dated September 13, 1907. 
• • • when it comes to your distinction between two meanings • • • I have 
to frankly cry peccavi--you convict me of real sin. Consequences of true 
ideas per se, and consequences of ideas ~ believed bY us, are logicallJ 
different consequences, and the whole "wrIl to beiiev6t ousiness has got 
to be re-edited wi. th explicit uses made of the distinction. I have been 
careless here, and I hope that you • • • will spread out that matter at 
the lengt~ it deserves. Failure to do it on my part has been a misdemean-
or •••• 
James never had the time or interest to get to that lire-editing" and as a 
result there is a split down the middle of the whole of his philosophy. 
'Perry, vol. II, p. 481. 
.. 
~: 
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On the tender-minded side there are the will to believe, James' cosmology, 
and his philosophy of religion. On the tough-minded side we find radical em-
piricism, James' theory of truth, and his psychological writings. His ethical 
doctrine seems to embody parts of both theories of meaning. The two complement 
each other in his mind, but nevertheless there are two theories of meaning, two 
philosophies of William James. 
Within this thesis we have progressed from a consideration of James' gen-
eral philosophic view of life, to his refusal to handle the question of freedom 
as a psychologist and his solution of the problem as a moral philosopher, to 
these closing remarks concerning the methodology he employed throughout. It is 
hoped that this exposition of what he said of human freedom and the way that 
~e arrived at it will shed some small light upon the human condition, today 
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